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1EXPORTING WESTERN LAW TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD:  
THE TROUBLING CASE OF NIGER 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent decades the West1 has imposed on the Developing World the so-called 
Washington Consensus, a package of policy reforms that, if implemented properly, is 
supposed to propel poor countries toward First World prosperity.2 In the United States, 
popular accounts of the Consensus focus on its economic policies and their social 
consequences.  The usual story is that Western countries and the financial institutions 
they control, most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, insist 
that a given poor country implement policies of privatization and trade liberalization.  
The poor country’s government, having little choice in the matter, begins to comply with 
these “structural adjustment” initiatives, which leads to protests and general social unrest 
when the citizenry realizes, among other things, that the price of bread has doubled 
overnight.3
1 I use the term West to refer generally and inexactly to those countries, primarily though not exclusively in 
North American and Europe, that control most of the world’s wealth and thereby have the means to exert 
political dominance over the rest of the world.  This inexact group also goes by the name of the First 
World, Developed Countries and the Global North. 
2 See Ali Zafar, Revenue and the Fiscal Impact of Trade Liberalization: The Case of Niger 4 (World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3500, February 2005) (noting that standard trade theory suggests that trade 
liberalization leads to more efficient allocation of resources, enhanced productivity, and higher economic 
growth); REPUBLIC OF NIGER, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, POVERTY REDUCTION 
STRATEGY 69 (January 2002) (referring to the role of law reform in creating a “favorable investment 
climate”); James Gathii, Human Rights, The World Bank and the Washington Consensus: 1949-1999, 94 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 144, 145 (April, 2000) (stating that the World Bank views its Washington 
Consensus reforms as an “engine of growth” for developing economies);  Michel Chossudovsky, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS 17 (1997). 
3 See, e.g., Jon Jeter, The Dumping Ground: As Zambia Courts Western Markets, Used Good Arrive at a 
Heavy Price, THE WASHINGTON POST, April 22, 2002, at A1 (referring to suffering in Zambia as a 
result of World Bank economic policies); Nigeria Police Fire on Crowd Protesting Austerity Program, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, A12 (reporting violent demonstrations in Nigeria over its structural 
2But there is another important aspect of Consensus reform that we rarely read 
about in the Western popular press, one that has the potential to create at least as much 
social unrest: legal reform.  The Washington Legal Consensus4 holds that poor countries 
must reshape their legal systems to make them compatible with Western conceptions of 
law and justice.  If they do not, they will fail to attract trade and investment, and will be 
left out of the long term prosperity made possible by the Consensus economic reforms.5
Scholars who have scrutinized the Washington Legal Consensus have found much 
to criticize.6 Some abhor that Consensus reformers impose new laws and legal concepts 
after minimal consultation with the affected populations.7 Others find it troubling that 
educated elites within poor countries tend to use Consensus legal reforms to consolidate 
their economic and political power.8 Many observe that the hoped-for economic benefits 
 
adjustment program); Charles Derber, Op-Ed., Will the World be Ruled By Money or Human Rights?, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, April 15, 2000, at A15 (referring to structural adjustment bread riots “from Caracas to 
Jakarta”). 
4 To the best of my knowledge, no commentator has used the term Washington Legal Consensus.  I will 
adopt it in this paper and assume that its meaning is self-explanatory. 
5 See THE WORLD BANK, MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A COUNTRY 
ASSISTANCE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD BANK FOR THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER 4 (January 21, 
2003)(identifying a weak and understaffed judicial system as a key barrier to economic development); 
REPUBLIC OF NIGER, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY 
65, 69 (January 22, 2002) (stating that “strengthening and consolidating the state of law” is vital to poverty 
reduction). 
6 See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES 3 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, eds., 2002); Heinz Klug, Hubrid(ity) Rules: 
Creating Local Law in a Globalized World, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, 
EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY  278-279 (Yves Dezalay & 
Brant G. Garth, eds., 2002);  see also Alkash Alhada, Les Principes Generaux, in LES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME AU NIGER: THEORIES ET REALITES 79 (Theodore Holo ed., 2001) (suggesting that 
Niger’s adoption of Western human rights laws is merely a “charm offensive” directed at donor countries). 
7 See Terrence Halliday, CROSSING OCEANS, SPANNING CONTINENTS: EXPORTING EDELMAN 
TO GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND MARKET-BUILDING, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 213, 217 (June 
2004). 
8 See Paul H. Brietzke, The Politics of Legal Reform, WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2004) 
(arguing that elites tend to gain in power and influence through the process of structural adjustment and 
legal reform); see also Klug, supra note 6, at 280. 
3of legal reform rarely materialize.9 Few scholars, however, have offered a detailed look 
at how the Washington Legal Consensus actually plays out on the ground in developing 
countries, and how it affects the lives of ordinary people living there.  
This paper will attempt to fill that gap by examining the particular case of Niger, 
an especially poor and isolated country that is in the midst of Consensus-inspired law 
reform. It will describe the law that most contemporary Nigeriens rely on to resolve their 
day-to-day disputes, and will conclude that Consensus-mandated legal reforms, which are 
grounded in liberal Western conceptions of law and justice, are so fundamentally 
different from the law and justice that people live by day-to-day, that the attempt at 
abrupt reform will cause significant social dislocation.   
A. Organization of the Paper 
On the theory that most readers are unfamiliar with traditional Nigerien law or 
anything like it, the paper will open in Part I.B with a brief descriptive example, leaving 
analysis of that law for later.  Part II will provide a summary description of the 
Washington Legal Consensus and its application in Niger.  Part III will furnish the reader 
with necessary background on Niger, including a general description its law from the 
opposite perspectives of Niger’s government and its ordinary citizens.  Because the law 
that most Nigeriens live by is inexorably connected with their history and religion, those 
topics also will be touched upon.  In Part IV, the paper will take a turn into legal 
ethnography, discussing concrete examples of the spiritually influenced, magic-infused, 
traditional law that the majority of Niger’s people live by, and highlighting some of the 
fundamental differences between this law and that which the Washington Legal 
Consensus seeks to impose.  Part V will conclude the paper by positing that trouble is in 
 
9 Brietzke, supra note 8, at 17; see Zafar, supra note 2, at 8-10, 20. 
4store for Niger if it continues to follow the Consensus-mandated path it is on, and 
suggesting some alternative approaches that might facilitate the development of Niger’s 
legal system without throwing the country into turmoil. 
B. First example of Nigerien traditional law: the gon oracle informs a man 
which of his two wives has been stealing from him. 10 
It is midmorning in the Zongo11 neighborhood of Niger’s capital, Niamey.  A 
crowd of agitated people gathers at the family home of the Sarkin of Zongo, the 
traditional chief whose clan has reigned over this area of town since the early 20th 
century.  The people, perhaps twenty of them, are squeezed into a narrow dirt walkway 
between two mud buildings and they are arguing about thefts.  A man – well educated 
and prosperous by Nigerien standards – is at the center of the throng.  He tells the Sarkin 
that he is sure that one of his two wives, both of whom are present, has been stealing 
from him.  In the recent past, money, valuable clothing, and expensive prayer rugs have 
disappeared from his home, and he has had enough.  He has brought them to the Sarkin, 
who, he knows, can perform the gon, an oracle that will reveal which of his wives is 
guilty.   
 
10 All of the events described in this vignette are based on Zongo Field Notes 00001, Niamey, Republic of 
Niger (February 18, 2004).  Part IV.A., below, describes the methodology I employed in studying 
traditional Nigerien law. 
11 Zongo is a word of Hausa origin that describes neighborhoods where outsiders settle.  Typically, Muslim 
traders established Zongo neighborhoods on the outskirts of existing cities and towns.  Historically, Zongo 
neighborhoods were centers of both trade and Islamic piety.  Today, there are Zongo neighborhoods 
throughout West Africa and the Western Sudan.  See Allan Christelow, Islamic Law in Africa, in 
HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AFRICA 379 (Nihemia Levitzion & Randall L. Pouwells, eds., 2000); see also 
Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, Niamey, Republic of Niger (February 6, 2004) (recounting the history 
of Niamey’s Zongo neighborhood). 
5Because innocence and guilt in traditional Nigerien society apply to whole 
families,12 the mothers, fathers, and assorted siblings of both wives are present to witness 
the gon. The aggrieved husband takes the lead in describing the thefts to the Sarkin, but 
the family members constantly and loudly intervene with additional facts, clarifications, 
and challenges.  
The crowd also includes several men and women of various ages from the 
neighborhood around the Sarkin’s compound.  They have come to watch the show, for 
although the reading13 of the gon is an everyday event in Zongo,14 the dispute today is 
more heated and therefore more interesting than usual. 
There also are two young boys lingering on the periphery of the tumult.  One of 
them holds two reeds, each about two feet long, in his hand.  The other boy holds an 
ornate, gold-embossed copy of the Koran in one hand and a rolled, tattered plastic prayer 
mat in the other.  Both boys periodically make eye contact with a tall, thin man who 
stands off to the side, out of the fray.  He is the marabout, the religious leader who will 
read the words that will give power to the gon oracle. 
When the Sarkin of Zongo has heard enough from the man, his wives, and their 
assorted family members, he quiets the crowd and says it is time to consult the oracle.  As 
 
12 See, supra Part III.D.2; Thomas Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets into Pigeon Holes: The Effects of 
Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, 34 NYU JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 635, 677 (Spring 2002); see also REPUBLIC OF NIGER, 
MISSION D’ANALYSE ET DE FORMULATION DU CADRE GENERAL DU PROCESSUS DE 
REFORMES ET DU PROGRAMME D’APPUI AUX REFORMES JUDICIARES AU NIGER (PARJ)  
KR-1994 26 (February 2003) [hereinafter Mission d’Analyse] (stating that Niger’s traditional conception of 
law applies to collectivities rather than individuals). 
13 Whereas in English we would use the verb “perform,” as in, “the marabout performed the gon,” 
Nigeriens invariably use the verb “read” (in Zarma, caw).  As described in the present section of the paper 
and in Part IV.B.1, below, reading from the Koran is an important element of the oracle.  Further, Nigeriens 
may favor the verb read because they generally associate the written word and reading with mystical power 
such as that exhibited by the gon oracle.  See Ladislav Holy, RELIGION AND CUSTOM IN A MUSLIM 
SOCIETY, THE BERTI OF SUDAN 10 (1991). 
14 Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11. 
6the parties and the observers settle in, the two young boys who were lingering on the 
fringe walk to the center of the room to assume their roles in the gon. They hand the 
Koran to the marabout and then roll out the plastic prayer mat.  They kneel on the mat 
facing one another, about two feet apart, and peel off their shirts.  Each boy places the 
ends of the reeds between his thumbs and forefingers, and raises them toward his nipples.  
As they wait for the Sarkin and the marabout to proceed, they hold the reeds between 
their chests, forming a rectangle in which the reeds are parallel to one another about eight 
inches apart.  
 The Sarkin stands beside the kneeling boys and explains to all present that in 
order to arrive at the full truth he must name each of the items stolen, and, for each such 
item, ask each wife to submit to the gon oracle.  He announces that the first item tested 
will be the husband’s missing clothing.  He directs the senior wife to stand next to him, 
then leads her through an oath that focuses the gon’s revelatory powers solely on the 
stolen clothing (ensuring that it does not react to some other wrong she has committed), 
and states that if she is guilty, the reeds will bend toward her hand and “trap” her.    
The Sarkin then instructs the senior wife to bend over and place her hand between 
the two reeds.  As she does so, the two boys place the ends of the reeds against their 
nipples and, leaning slightly toward one another, suspend them between their chests.  At 
the instant the wife lowers her hand, the marabout, who is sitting in the corner, begins to 
chant the yassina, a verse from the holy Koran.  Almost immediately the reeds begin to 
wobble, and then bow definitively outward, indicating that the senior wife is innocent of 
stealing the clothing.  The junior wife is then called to submit to the same procedure.  
7This time, the reeds bow inward, indicating that she is guilty.  She does not protest her 
innocence; she simply walks back to her place and waits for her next turn. 
 In this fashion, the Sarkin proceeds methodically through the list of stolen items.  
The gon reveals that the junior wife stole the clothing and the money, while the senior 
wife stole the expensive prayer rugs.  When the gon is complete, both wives admit before 
their families and the gathered crowd that they have been justly found guilty of their 
wrongs.  The Sarkin, the marabout, and the fathers of both wives huddle together for a 
quick consultation and agree that the husband and his wives should return immediately to 
their community and gather together the elders to attempt to negotiate peace among the 
family members and find a way by which they can continue to live together.  
II. The Washington Consensus 
 A. The Consensus in General 
The primary impetus for Niger’s current state law reform project comes from the 
Washington Legal Consensus.15 While it is true that western-educated urban elites16 and 
some rural elites17 express enthusiasm for legal westernization, the push has come 
primarily from donor countries and the financial institutions they control.18 
15Interview with Oumarou Rabo Mainassara, Director of Study of Legislative Reform and Integration, 
Niger Ministry of Justice, Niamey, Republic of Niger (November 23, 2003) (stating the World Bank and 
donor countries are behind the push for law reform); see Jurgen Kurtz, Comment to Professor Stephen D. 
Krasner in symposium entitled Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law, 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104 (Summer 2004)(referring to the West’s insistence upon legal reform in poor 
countries); Klug, supra note 3, at 278 (employing the term “global insistence” to refer to the West’s push 
for legal reform in the developing world). 
16 See, e.g,, Interview with Niger’s Permanent Secretary of the Rural Code, Niamey, Republic of Niger, 
(November 10, 2003) (expressing the view that law reform is necessary because traditional law is corrupt 
and inefficient).  
17 Traditional chiefs tend to solidify their control of land and other valuable resources when western laws 
are introduced and enforced. See Paul H. Brietzke, supra note 8 , at 5-7 (arguing that elites tend to gain in 
power and influence through the process of structural adjustment and legal reform); see also Shem E. 
Migot-Adholla & John Bruce, Are Indigenous African Tenure Systems Insecure?, in SEARCHING FOR 
LAND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA 1, 9 (Shem E. Migot-Adholla & John Bruce eds., 1994) 
(arguing that studies have shown that elites took advantage of land tenure reform in Kenya to enrich 
8In general, the Consensus holds that economic and social development (the theory 
assumes that the latter inevitably follows the former) are possible only if poor countries 
privilege the market as the locus of economic decision making.19 Accordingly, it calls for 
reducing social spending and reallocating resources to the private sector,20 budgetary 
austerity, trade liberalization and privatization,21 and privatization of agricultural land.22 
The legal part of the Consensus requires poor countries to reform their laws as a 
means of permitting the prosperity promised by the Consensus economic policies.  Under 
the rubric of good governance, it requires transparency, consistency, and predictability of 
laws to provide would-be investors with a stable and inviting governmental and legal 
framework in which to do business.23 
Poor countries often have little choice in the matter of reform.  The World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, along with other multilateral financial institutions 
and bilateral donor countries, dole out money to poor countries in the form of “policy 
based loans” that contain so called “conditionalities.”24 These conditionalities state, in 
essence, that the poor countries do not get the money unless their governments comply 
 
themselves); Kelley, supra note 12, at 684 (recounting an episode where an elder, elite, rural Nigerien sold 
land out from under his extended family’s control). 
18 See Michael Chossudovsky, supra note 2, at 16 (arguing that the power of the Bretton Woods 
organizations lies with their majority shareholders who are the governments of the world’s rich countries). 
19 Gathii, supra note 2, at 145. 
20 Id.
21 Chossudovsky, supra note 2, at 35. 
22 Id. at 67. 
23 Brietzke, supra note 8, at 4; see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction to GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 6, at 1; Kurtz, supra note 15, at 1104; Sally Engle Merry, From Law and 
Colonialism to Law and Globalization: Martin Chanook. Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial 
Experience in Malawi and Zambia, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 570 (arguing rule of law and judicial 
reforms are motivated by economic considerations such as the need to establish a legal infrastructure for 
investment and trade as countries all over the world strive “to become valued members of the so-called 
international community”); Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 107 (offering the Government of Niger’s 
articulation of the connection between legal reform and economic development). 
24 Chossudovsky, supra note 2, at 51.   
9fully with the pre-packaged economic and legal reforms.25 We will discuss below how 
Niger is faring as a result of its submission to the Consensus, but it is not giving away too 
much now to say that, in general, the track record of these externally inspired reforms, 
including the law reform project, has been poor.26 
B. The Legal Consensus in Niger 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a detailed description of Niger’s 
externally developed plans for economic and legal reform.  As to economic reform, it 
must suffice to say that the plan is roughly in accord with the general description of the 
Consensus provided above, 27 and that thus far it has caused pain and consternation 
among Niger’s people and little if anything in the way of beneficial economic 
development.28 The law reform aspects of the plan are somewhat more difficult to 
discern, because there is no single World Bank or IMF document that sketches its 
 
25 Id. at 51-52 (adding that countries that decline to comply with the structural adjustment dictates of the 
Bretton Woods organizations find themselves cut off not only from their economic largess, but from grants 
and loans by other multilateral and bilateral sources of funds in the West); see also Kurtz, supra note 15, at 
1105 (arguing that international financial institutions controlled by the West force developing countries to 
sign off on law reform plans by threatening to withhold desperately needed financial support). 
26 See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that the new “rule of law industry” cannot claim many 
successes); see also Zafar, supra note 2, at 4, 20 (concluding that the World Bank inspired structural 
adjustment program for Niger, particularly its trade liberalization program, has caused significant fiscal 
damage without spurring increased trade). 
27 See generally REPUBLIC OF NIGER, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, POVERTY 
REDUCTION STRATEGY (January 2002) (laying out the long term poverty reduction plan developed by 
the IMF and the Government of Niger). 
28 See Zafar, supra note 2, at 4, 20 (concluding that the World Bank inspired structural adjustment program 
for Niger, particularly its trade liberalization program, has caused significant fiscal damage without 
spurring trade); see also Maman Abou, La grogne . . , LE REPUBLICAIN, March 17-23, 2005, at 1 
(reporting popular discontent over IMF fiscal policy); Mahamadou Diallo, Tenailles par la Misere, 60,000 
Manifestatns dans les Rues de Niamey, LE REPUBLICAIN, March 17-23, 2005, at 4 (same); S.A., 
Gigantesque Manifestation a Niamey Contre la Vie Chere, LE DEMOCRATE, March 17, 2005, at 1, 4-5 
(reporting demonstrations and offering a critique of IMF fiscal policy); Interview with the Director of the 
Project Supporting Good Governance and the Promotion of the Private Sector, Ministry of Finance, 
Niamey, Republic of Niger (February 24, 2004) (saying “good governance” has developed slowly in Niger 
because of the hardship and social unrest caused by structural adjustment). 
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contours.29 We therefore must rely at least partly on newspaper accounts, interviews with 
government officials, and speculation. 
Since1999, the year in which Niger’s most recent military dictator was ejected 
and the country launched into its first sustained period of democratic governance, the 
pace of legal reform has been blinding.30 Its leaders have passed a new Constitution, an 
Electoral Code, a Criminal Code, a Code of Criminal Procedure and a surfeit of 
international treaties and lesser bits of legislation.31 In addition, it drafted and debated 
(but did not pass) a controversial Family Code, and is rumored to be on the verge of 
passing a new Code of Civil Procedure.32 
Given the rapidity of the reform effort, it should not come as a surprise that many 
of the new laws whizzed by without opportunities for significant debate or reflection 
about their impact on Nigerien society.33 They were drafted mostly by outside experts34 
29 There is, however, the Mission d’Analyse, introduced in note 12, above.  It lays out a comprehensive 
program for reforming Niger’s judicial system.  It was funded by Danish, German, and French 
development organizations and was written for the Government of Niger by a European consulting 
organization.  The World Bank has declared that its intention is to leave the details of law reform in Niger 
up to donor countries with Denmark as the leader.  See THE WORLD BANK, MEMORANDUM OF THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 5, at 10-11. 
30 Niger’s law reform efforts actually began gradually in the 1970s with an effort to Westernize land law.  
Through much of the 1970s and 80s the World Bank pushed freehold land titling as an essential precursor 
to economic growth in the developing world, including Niger.  Interview with Oumarou Rabo Mainassra, 
supra note 15 (expressing the view that the World Bank and Western donor countries pressured Niger to 
undertake land law reform); see generally WORLD BANK, LAND REFORM (Policy Paper No. 11018, 
May 1975), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_Ibank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=00178330_98101911122064. With 
funding and technical expertise from the West, Niger embarked on an ambitious effort – one that continues 
to this day – to shift land from traditional, often communal, control to something like a uniform system of 
freehold titling.  While there is no evidence that the Western land reforms have spurred economic 
investment, there is ample evidence that they have caused instability in the form of violent struggle over 
title to formerly communal land and land-grabbing by rural elites.  See generally Christian Lund, LAW, 
POWER AND POLITICS IN NIGER: LAND STRUGGLES AND THE RURAL CODE (1998). 
31 The lesser legislation includes the laws governing the National Assembly, the decentralization of Niger’s 
government, non-governmental organizations and domestic associations, magistrates, and the legal 
profession. 
32 See Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 64 (discussing the need for a Civil Procedure Code). 
33 See Brietzke, supra note 8, at 22 (arguing that Western legal reformers’ desire to “get things done 
quickly” leads them to implant reforms that are “rushed, poor in quality, and unimplemented or 
unimplementable”). 
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and rushed through Niger’s National Assembly, a newly created legislative body in 
which a significant percentage of representatives neither speak nor read French, the 
language in which the laws were written.35 Another, very much longer, article would be 
required to review the contents of this bonanza of newly reformed laws, but for our 
limited purposes we can say that in most fundamental respects, they are like the laws of 
the United States and Western Europe: they emphasize the protection of individual rights, 
due process, rational proof, and the individual punishment and deterrence of anti-social 
acts. 
The new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes can stand in as representative 
examples of the Consensus-inspired reforms. 36 We focus on them partly for the simple 
reason that I was able to obtain written copies of their texts37 and partly because they 
provide a tidy comparison with the traditional law that we explore in Parts I.B, above, 
and IV.B.1, below. 
For our purposes, the most significant change to the new Criminal Code is the 
adoption of uncomplicated language to the effect that “no one is criminally responsible 
 
34 See Interview with Oumarou Rabo Mainassra, supra note 15 (the Ministry of Justice official in charge of 
reviewing new laws stating that his office has no personnel at its disposal and not even an internet 
connection and cannot possibly give substantive input on all of the laws being passed in Niger). 
35 When I posed the question to Nigerien scholars whether the legislature debated and discussed the impact 
that this view of justice would have on rural communities, they laughed.  In the case of the Penal Code, 
there was barely time to read the draft before it was passed, and, even if there had been time, a majority of 
the members of the National Assembly are not fluent in French and cannot read or write their own mother 
tongues.  See Interview with Professor Sidikou Harouna, Niamey, Republic of Niger (November 19, 2003).  
According to gossip among lawyers in Niamey, the process of drafting and passing the Penal Code was so 
rushed that the initially passed version had to be withdrawn when judicial officials realized that the country 
did not have enough jail cells for all the people who would be imprisoned under the new laws.  They had to 
go back and devise provisions for alternatives to incarceration. 
36 The “old” Criminal Code was a wholesale adoption at Independence in 1961 of the French Criminal 
Code.  See Kelley, supra note 12, at 659.  For reasons discussed in Part III.D.1, below, its implementation 
over the years has been spotty at best. 
37 Obtaining printed copies of laws in Niger poses a challenge for the legal scholar.  Often, the Western 
countries who help write the laws pay to have a certain number of copies printed.  Officials in the 
government ministries that are affected by the new laws typically sell their allotted copies to private book 
dealers who hawk their wares from street side tables.  One searching for printed versions of official laws 
must therefore wander through the capital haggling with the book dealers. 
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except for by his own acts.”38 This statement may appear unremarkable and 
uncontroversial to a Western lawyer, but in fact it was inserted with the intention of 
effecting a fundamental change in the way Nigeriens view criminal responsibility.  
Instead of placing responsibility for crimes with families and larger social units, as 
described in Part III.D.2, below, the new law insists that responsibility for crime (and the 
attendant punishment) be confined only to the individual wrongdoer.    
The newly reformed Criminal Code also attempts to bring Niger into the modern 
world, and to bring its domestic law into conformity with the many international treaties 
it has signed since independence, by creating penalties for female genital mutilation, the 
intentional transmission of HIV, sexual harassment, genocide, war crimes, and the 
practice of slavery.39 In keeping with the World Bank’s economic goals, it creates new 
criminal categories for practices that retard economic progress, such as usury and Internet 
fraud.40 
The new Code of Criminal Procedure lays out a scheme that should be familiar to 
any Western lawyer.  It enshrines notions of due process and fair trial.  For example, it 
provides that the criminally accused will have the right to the assistance of counsel.41 It 
further provides procedural guarantees that limit the time and scope of criminal 
 
38 Book I, Title II, Chapter I, Section 1, Article 4 of the Loi no. 2003-25 du 13 juin 2003, modifiant la loi 
no 61-27 du 15 juillet 1961, portant institution de la code penal, Journal Officiel de la Republique du Niger, 
December 15, 2003 [hereinafter Loi no. 2003-25] (« Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre 
fait »).   
39 See  Book II, Title III, Chapter VI, Section 2, of the Loi no. 2003-25.   
40 See  Book II, Title VII of the Loi no. 2003-25 ; see also H. B. Tcherno, Interviews du Ministre de la 
Justice: Les Grandes Lignes de la Reforme du Code Penal, 255 Groupe Alternative (July 20, 2001), at 
http://www.altervative.ne/hebdo/2001/255/p_code.htm. 
41 Book I, Title I, Chapter II, Section III, Article 6 of the Loi no. 2003-26 du 13 juin 2003 modifiant la loi 
no 61-33 du 14 aout 1961, portant institution du Code de procedure penale, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique du Niger, December 15, 2003 [hereinafter Loi no 2003-26]. 
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investigations and cut back on the use of pre-trial detention.42 It even provides the 
possibility of financial compensation for those who have been wrongly detained by 
judicial authorities.43 In short, it creates a Western system of criminal procedure based 
on the assumption that crimes, including theft, are matters to be resolved between 
individual perpetrators and the state, that responsibility is to be determined through a 
process of rational fact gathering, followed by impartial trial, leading (at least in some 
cases) to conviction and punishment in the form of fines and imprisonment. 
Although the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure laws do not state so 
explicitly, they implicitly reject Niger’s traditional legal norms.  As we will discuss at 
more length in Part III.D.2, below, the new Codes do not recognize the collective legal 
responsibility of family members,44 do not permit families and larger communities to 
resolve criminal matters through ad hoc negotiation,45 do not provide for reinsertion into 
the community,46 and do not permit the consideration of spiritually determined oracular 
evidence such as that produced by the gon.
There is another vitally important aspect of Niger’s Washington Consensus legal 
reform that is not revealed anywhere in the text of the laws that are being promulgated.  It 
is the assumption that the modernization of Niger’s law requires not only that these new, 
Western laws be passed, but that they be consistently and uniformly enforced.47 Such 
enforcement is not possible, reformers contend, unless the country’s irrational and 
unpredictable legal traditions, such as reliance on the gon oracle, are eliminated. 
 
42 See, e.g., Title III, Chapter I, Section VIII, Article 31 of the Loi no. 2003-26.  
43 Title III, Chapter I, Section VII, Article 143-1 of the Loi no. 2003-26. 
44 See Tcherno, supra note 40, at p. 6. 
45 Kelley, supra note 12, at 696. 
46 Id. 
47 See Mission d’Analyze, supra note 12, at 45; Tcherno, supra note 40, at p. 6. 
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C. Summary 
For Niger, the gist of the Washington Legal Consensus is that if it wishes its 
economic boat to rise with the tide of global trade, and, in the shorter term, if it wishes to 
receive financial support from Western countries and the financial institutions they 
control, it must rapidly reform its legal system to make it look and feel more like legal 
systems in the West.   
We will come back to the Washington Legal Consensus in Part V, below.  For 
now, we turn our attention to a subject that proponents of the Washington Legal 
Consensus seem consistently to ignore: the culture and the law of the place that is to be 
westernized; in this case, Niger.   
III. Background on Niger 
 Relatively little has been written in English about Niger,48 but for our limited 
purposes we need know relatively little.  A few points are of paramount importance.  
First, it is extremely poor.  Second, largely due to that material poverty, it has remained 
comparatively isolated from the Western world.  Third, its spiritual beliefs are complex 
and unique, and are bound inextricably with what we in the West consider “law.”  
Finally, “law” in contemporary Niger is not what it first might appear. 
A. Vital Statistics 
According to the United Nations, Niger is the least developed country in the 
World.49 Approximately four fifths of its landmass is located in the Sahara Desert, and 
 
48 See Finn Fuglestad, A HISTORY OF NIGER 1850-1960 (1983); Robert Charlick, NIGER: PERSONAL 
RULE AND SURVIVAL IN THE SAHEL (1991); Kelley, supra note 12, at 635. 
49 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005 NIGER COUNTRY 
FACT SHEET (2005), available at hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NER.html. 
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only a small percentage of its land is arable.50 Niger’s population stands at more than 13 
million, and its annual population growth rate, at 3.3 %, as well as its fertility rate, at 7.9 
live births per woman, are among the highest in the world.51 More than a quarter of 
Nigerien children die before they reach the age of 5, and a child born between 2000 and 
2005 has less than a 40% chance of surviving to the age of 40.52 Overall life expectancy 
is 44 years, which ranks among the lowest in the world.53 This truncated average life 
span is all the more remarkable when one realizes that HIV/AIDs is not prevalent in 
Niger, and thus is not a major cause of early mortality.54 
Niger’s adult literacy rate is 14%, and only 38% of eligible children were enrolled 
in primary school during the 2002-2003 academic year.55 Those numbers are markedly 
lower for Nigerien women, and overall the United Nations ranks Niger last in the world 
in terms of building the capabilities of women. 56 
Per capita gross domestic product in Niger is $800 per year, and 61% of the 
population lives off of less than $1 per day.57 Rural subsistence agriculture, herding, and 
informal trading activities account for most of the country’s meager economic activity.58 
50 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK: NIGER (2005), available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ng.html (reporting 4% of land as arable); BUREAU OF 
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: NIGER (March 2005), 
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5474.htm (reporting 15% of land as arable).  
51 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005 __ (2003) 
[hereinafter U.N. DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005]. 
52 Id. at __; see also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 50. 
53 U.N. DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 51, at __. 
54 See id. at __ (reporting HIV prevalence at 1.2% of Niger’s  population). 
55 Id. 
56 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005 NIGER COUNTRY 
FACT SHEET (2005), available at hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NER.html. 
57 Id. 




Niger’s development trend is markedly downward.  In the early and mid 1970s 
the country enjoyed a brief period of relative economic prosperity based upon 
exploitation of uranium deposits in its northern mountains, but the bottom dropped out of 
that market in the early 1980s and Niger’s economy has been in decline ever since.59 
Short and long term economic prospects are bleak, as captured by the World Bank’s 
recent, sobering assessment: 
Niger’s prospects are clouded by a lack of natural resources and a highly 
degraded natural environment, explosive population growth, extremely low 
human and institutional capacity, very limited international competitiveness, its 
location in a particularly volatile sub-regional context, uncertain donor 
commitment, and years of poor governance.60 
How did Niger arrive at this conjuncture?  A glance at its history, with an 
emphasis on the history of the southwestern portion of the country, reveals that for 
several centuries it has remained comparatively isolated from many of the currents that 
have swept across the African continent, including colonization and globalization.  
B. A History of Isolation   
Although the territory that is now Niger was influenced by and occasionally home 
to pre-colonial city states, principalities and empires, no unified, centralized state existed 
in this region when the French colonists arrived at the turn of the 19th century. 61 There 
was no overarching political leadership, no hereditary leadership class, and, significant 
for our purposes, no formal courts or unified legal system.    
 
59 See id; see also BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 50. 
60 WORLD BANK, Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association To The 
Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank for the Republic of Niger, Report 
No. 25203-NIR, at page i (January 21, 2003); see also Interview with Vincent Turbat, World Bank 
Representative in Niger, Niamey, Republic of Niger (February 5, 2004) (expressing that view that Niger’s 
only present potential for connecting to the global economy was with vegetable gardening and the 
exportation of beef).  
61 See Charlick, supra note 48, at 29; Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan, LES SOCIETES SONGHAY-ZARMA 
(NIGER-MALI) 20 (1984); Fuglestad, supra note 48, at 34-35. 
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Though life for Nigerien people changed with colonization,62 profound French 
cultural, social and legal influence was confined mostly to urban areas,63 and to an 
educated class of evolues, or “evolved people,” through whom the French ruled.64 
Because Niger possessed few exploitable natural resources, the French practiced what the 
economic and social historian Sara Berry refers to as “hegemony on a shoestring.”65 By 
and large, they were happy to let rural Nigeriens govern themselves as they pleased, so 
long as they paid taxes, planted the cash crops dictated by France’s economic strategy, 
and supplied sufficient numbers of young men for road construction and other colonial 
infrastructure projects.66 
The end result was that the traditions of rural people in Niger, including their 
legal traditions, survived longer than they would have if, for example, the country had 
been endowed with diamonds or valuable timber.67 This explains, at least in part, why 
legal traditions such as the gon oracle are vibrant in Niger at the dawn of the 21st century. 
 Many Nigerien legal traditions, including the use of the gon oracle to identify 
wrongdoers, exist at the intersection of our Western categories of religion and law.  
 
62 See Interview with Village Chief of Gogazi and a group of elders, Gogazi, Republic of Niger (February 
19, 2004) (saying that the arrival of the French meant an end to raiding and slavery, and the start of forced 
labor for the colonial regime); Interview with Bonzoubou Nya and a group of villagers, Fandou Berri, 
Republic of Niger (May 15, 2000) (recounting stories of the colonial era). 
63 See Kimba Idrissa, La dynamique de la gouvernance: administration, politique et ethnicite au Niger, in 
LE NIGER: ETAT ET DEMOCRATIE 26-27 (Kimba Idrissa, ed., 2001) (arguing that Niger’s pre and post 
independence states were “minimal,” that traditional chiefs were left to govern rural areas, and that there 
has been an “extraordinary continuity in the resistance to intrusion by the state, both colonial and post 
colonial”). 
64 See Charlick, supra note 48, at 40 (discussing the post-World War II growth of the evolues as a new 
social group with distinct political and economic interests); Fuglestad, supra note 40, at 120-121, 163. 
65 Sarah Berry, NO CONDITION IS PERMANENT:  THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN 
CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 23-24 (1993). 
66 See Charlick, supra note 48, at 35-37. 
67 See Mahomadou Arzika, Droit et Societe au Niger: L’Evolution du Droit Coutoumier 40 (1985) 
(unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Strassbourg)(on file with author) (arguing that traditional 
social structures remained relatively intact through the brief French colonial period). 
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While such categories do not exist in the minds of most Nigeriens, our task will be 
simplified if we continue to rely on them.68 We shall take them in turn. 
C. Complex Spiritual Beliefs 
To understand Niger’s complex belief system, we will begin with an overview of 
Niger’s pre-Islamic traditions69 and then briefly sketch the historical development of 
Islam in Niger.  We will close our discussion with a description of Niger’s contemporary 
blend of traditional and Islamic beliefs.  
1. Pre-Islamic spiritual belief 
Pre-Islamic Nigerien belief divided the world in to social and spirit domains.70 
Humans, who inhabit the social domain, are powerless actors in a universe filled with 
powerful spiritual forces that can and sometimes do destroy individuals and social 
groups.71 The spirits control everything from crop destroying grasshoppers and other 
vermin to rain, sickness, and longevity.72 The actors in the spirit realm include a 
pantheon of hundreds of individual spirits, some good and some helpful, others evil and 
vengeful.73 If offended, they can wreak havoc in the lives of mortal men and women.74 
68 See infra, Part IV.A (discussing categorical confusion in legal ethnography).  
69 As with the designations “law” and “religion,” here again I have chosen a problematic label for the sake 
of clarity.  I use the phrase “pre-Islamic beliefs,” hoping to invoke a category that will seem sensible to my 
Western audience thereby clarifying this information.  However, as discussed below in Part II.C.3, these 
practices might have developed along side of Islam rather than before it, and Islam might have influenced 
their development.  In short, the term I use oversimplifies a complex reality. 
70 Paul Stoller, FUSION OF THE WORLDS: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF POSSESSION AMONG THE 
SONGHAY OF NIGER 14 (1989). 
71 Id. at 28; see Sidi Chegou, La Preuve des Faits par des Procedes Irrationelles au Niger (unpublished 
Masters of Law thesis, University of Niamey Faculty of Economic and Jurdic Sciences) (1992), pp. 4 (on 
file with author) (arguing the spirits intervene regularly in peoples’ day to day lives). 
72 Stoller, supra note 70, at xxi, 27; see also Interview with Djibou Mamadou (a practicing zima), Niamey, 
Republic of Niger (December 15, 2003). 
73 Jean Rouch, LES SONGHAY 62 (1954); see Interview with Djibou Mamadou, supra note 72 (describing 
different spirit families). 
74 Rouch, supra note 73, at 62. 
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Communication between the social and spirit realms is possible, and in fact can be 
necessary for maintaining harmony and health in the social realm.75 Typically, mortals 
who have had some misfortune or evil visited upon them will organize a possession 
ceremony in which spirits possess the bodies of humans and, communicating through 
them, explain why they are offended and what the humans can do to atone.76 
2. Islam 
Islam was introduced from North Africa to sub-Saharan West Africa in the eighth 
century along trans-Saharan trade routes.77 Although readily adopted by merchants and 
the ruling class, it did not penetrate into rural areas of Niger until quite recently.78 
The Islam that eventually took root in Niger is a supple, flexible variety that 
tolerates divergent traditions and worldviews.79 One reason for its flexibility is the 
Islamic doctrine of ijma, which olds that the consensus of the community of believers is 
divinely inspired and infallible,80 and that the consensus may include customs and 
traditions of the peoples that Islam has absorbed.81 Over time, through application of this 
doctrine, novel religious rights and beliefs from newly absorbed or conquered people 
have gained the stamp of orthodoxy, at least regionally.  Ijma has thus validated Nigerien 
 
75 Stoller, supra note 70, at 19, 52.   
76 Id; see Chegou, supra note 71, at 30-33.  
77 G.T. Stride & Carolina Ifeka, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES OF WEST AFRICA 133 (1971); Nehemia 
Levitzion, The Early States of the Western Sudan to 1500, in 1 HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA 129-32 
(J.F.A. Ajayui & Michael Crowder eds., 1972). 
78 Arzika, supra note 67, at 236 (arguing Islam did not penetrate into Niger until after the French 
pacification); Stride & Ifeka, supra note 77, at 141. 
79 See Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 162 (trans. Andras and Ruth 
Hamori 1981) 1910 (stating that the Koran warns against branding as unbelievers those whose opinions 
differ but who belong to those who participate in Islamic prayer services). 
80 Id. at 50. 
81 I.M. Lewis, Introduction to ISLAM IN TROPICAL AFRICA 45 (2nd ed. 1980) (I.M. Lewis, ed. 1964); 
see id.at 32 (arguing the Islam of Mohammed and of the Koran is unfinished, awaiting its completion in the 
work of generations to come). 
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rituals and beliefs that otherwise might have been censured by orthodox Muslims, 
including the use of oracles to resolve legal matters.82 
Another explanation of the flexibility of Niger’s religion is that most people there 
follow Islam’s Sufi tradition.  To a Sufi Mulslim,83 the goal of religion is to find and 
follow the way to personal communion with God, and the strict rules of the Koran are 
taken merely as points of departure that lead to that lofty path.84 Sufi Muslims are 
particularly tolerant of ancestor veneration and the belief in the mystical powers of 
spirits, so long as Allah remains preeminent and people do not pray directly to those 
spirits.85 
It is also a characteristic of Sufi Islam that a saintly, mystical master must guide 
the devotee’s spiritual quest.86 In Niger, and across West Africa, these men, for they 
invariably are men, are referred to as marabouts. Once a marabout is fully trained and 
his reputation established, his community relies on him to ward off misfortune and bring 
good luck, or barka.87 Marabouts accomplish this by creating charms88 that protect 
 
82 See Goldheizer, supra note 79, at 51; see also Ladislav Holy, RELIGION AND CUSTOM IN A 
MUSLIM SOCIETY, THE BERTI OF SUDAN 10 (1991); Loic Garcon, Etude de l’Evolution des 
Pratiques de l’Islam au Niger (Study and report commissioned by Office of the Embassy of Canada in 
Niger, July, 1998), at 26 (notes on file with author) (arguing that Islamic law in Niger is comprised largely 
of traditions absorbed into Islam). 
83 The word Suffi derives from the Arabic suf, or wool, that described the hair shirts donned by the self-
abnegating believers.  Annemarie Schimmel, MYSTICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM 14 (1975). 
84 See Goldziher, supra note 79, at 138-150 (arguing Sufi Muslims believe that beneath the literal sense of 
the sacred texts lie profound philosophical truths, which allegorical interpretations can bring to light). 
85 Lewis, supra note 81, at 62. 
86 Charlotte A. Quinn & Frederick Quinn, PRIDE, FAITH AND FEAR, ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 14, 92 (2003). 
87 See Jean Rouch, LA RELIGION ET LA MAGIE SONGHAY 289 (2d. ed. 1989) (1960); David Owusu-
Ansah, Prayer, Amulets, and Healing, in HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AFRICA 478, supra note 11. 
88 Vincent Monteil, Marabouts, in ISLAM IN AFRICA 94 (James Kritzeck & William H. Lewis, eds.  
1969).  Although we use the word “charm” or “amulet” or “talisman,” Zarmas use the word safari, which 
translates to “treatment” or “cure” and also is used to mean “medicine.”  They use the same word for 
traditional remedies as for antibiotics or aspirin obtained from pharmacies.  In other words, their 
vocabulary does not distinguish between spiritual and pharmaceutical medicine. 
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travelers from harm,89 cure outbreaks of measles,90 compel love and devotion from 
reluctant members of the opposite sex,91 and serve countless other protective and 
preventative functions.92 As we shall discuss at some length in Part IV, below, Nigerien 
Sufi Muslims also rely on marabouts to dispense what we would consider “law” by 
identifying thieves and other wrongdoers.93 
3. Today’s religious mixed bag 
Today, the vast majority of Niger’s people professes Islam and follows the Five 
Pillars,94 yet as a result of the processes of adaptation and evolution described above, 
their Islamic practice includes many elements that orthodox Middle Eastern Muslims find 
foreign, even heretical.95 This includes, for example, the belief that a person can obtain 
 
89 Before leaving Niger, friends from the village of Fandou Berri commissioned a marabout to make 
charms for my three children to protect them on their journey back to the United States.  They consist of 
selected verses from the Koran written on paper, folded, encased in protective leather pouches, then 
attached to string to be worn around the neck. 
90 During my recent stay in Niger I was alarmed one day to learn from a friend that there had been a 
measles outbreak in his village and that a child had died.  He assured me that the villagers had obtained 
safari, or medicine, that the outbreak had been contained, and that his children were no longer in danger.  
Later, when I visited the village and observed that all of the young children were laden with leather 
pouches, I inquired and learned that the “medicine” my friend had referred to was the charms that had been 
created by a powerful local marabout. See Interview with Bachirou Djibo, Fandou Berri, Republic of Niger 
(February 4, 2004). 
91 See Holy, supra note 82, at 32 (explaining that marabouts order the drinking of ink to induce the 
affection of a woman).  
92 See generally Owusu-Ansah, supra note 87, at 479; see also Holy, supra note 82, at 25, 27-33 
(explaining that the Koran is believed to have immense power to guarantee the wellbeing of those who 
internalize it, and that the literate achieve this result by memorizing it while the illiterate achieve the same 
effect by wearing Koranic verses as amulets or by drinking ink that has been used in writing Koranic 
verses); Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, Niamey, Republic of Niger (April 14, 2004) (stating that his 
work as a marabout includes healing the sick and writing verses that will help his clients intercede with 
God and get the result they’re seeking). 
93 See generally Holy, supra note 82, at 34. 
94 See id. at 1  (naming the five pillars as: bear witness to the oneness of God, perform five daily prayers, 
fast during Ramadan, pay annual alms, and carry out the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once). 
95 Scholars disagree on the historical mechanism by which Niger, and more generally West Africa, 
developed its heterodox, magic-infused brand of Islam.  Some speak of the “survival” of pre-Islamic 
practices.  Their assumption is that people living in West African communities where Islam was being 
introduced maintained their pre-Islamic beliefs and practices by simply layering a thin veneer of Islamic 
ritual onto their traditions and then calling them Muslim. Other scholars speak of  “great” and “little” 
traditions in Islam, the great being more orthodox beliefs and practices that emanate from the Middle East 
(where Islam was born) and “little” being the folk ways that have been incorporated into Islam as it has 
spread.  Still others criticize the “survival” thesis and “great versus little” dichotomy as overly simplistic.  
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Islamic charms that will make any knife turned against him melt before it penetrates his 
flesh.96 It also means that people believe that they can and should rely on nominally 
Islamic oracles like the gon to resolve certain kinds of legal disputes.  
D. Law in Niger   
We begin with an overview of the state legal system in Niger, then turn to a 
discussion of how most Nigeriens actually understand law.  
 1. State law in Niger 
Immediately following independence from France in 1960, Niger adopted the 
French Civil Code as its own state law, with a general exception for those laws that 
conflicted with Niger’s new constitution.97 The exception clause gave rise to enduring 
confusion, since no one bothered to point out which laws might conflict.98 In the end it 
hardly mattered because Niger spent most of the following decades under military rule, 
and state law became whatever the soldiers said it was.99 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the end of the Cold War, Niger has been lurching unevenly toward democratic 
rule.100 It is only since 1999, the beginning of Niger’s present sustained period of 
 
They note that the Koran recognizes mystical forces and spirits, and that Islam itself may have imported 
mystical practices to parts of Africa where they either did not exist before Islam or existed in other forms.  
These scholars view the relationship between Islam and non-Islamic belief systems as a fluid, ongoing 
exchange.  For a discussion of these points, see Holy, supra note 82, at 42 and 139, and I. M. Lewis, 
RELIGION IN CONTEXT: CULTS AND CHARISMA 139-142, 152 (2nd ed. 1996) 1986. 
96 I base this statement on an unrecorded conversation with Bachirou Djibo that took place during the early 
spring of 2004.  Devout Nigerien Muslims also consistently acknowledge the presence and importance of 
their ancestors’ spirits.  To give one example, a friend living in a rural Zarma village built a new grass hut 
for himself and his family, taking advantage of a prime spot of real estate that had been vacated when his 
paternal grandmother died.  When I asked why he did not build the new hut on the sand foundation of the 
old one, he responded matter-of-factly that he did not want to risk harm to his family by offending his 
grandmother’s spirit. Interview with Gibirou Djibo, Fandou Berri, Republic of Niger (May 6, 2004). 
97 Christian Lund, Struggles for Land and Political Power: On the Politicization of Land Tenure and 
Disputes in Niger, 40 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 8 (1998). 
98 Id. at 9. 
99 See Mission d’Analyse, supra note 22, at 6.  
100See id. at 5-6.  For a summary account of Niger’s post-Independence political and economic history, see 
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: NIGER, 
supra note 50. 
23
democracy and relative stability, that the country’s leaders, encouraged by donor nations 
and international financial institutions,101 began taking a close look at its legal system 
with an eye toward making it coherent, rational, and modern.102 
From the government’s perspective, and from the perspective of legal experts 
from Western donor countries, Niger’s law is based upon a Constitution, adopted in 1999, 
that enshrines principles familiar to the West.103 For example, it embraces the separation 
of powers (article 28), the separation of church and state (article 4), a society based on the 
rule of law (article 99), an independent judiciary (articles 100 and 101), and a respect for 
internationally defined human rights (articles 10-34).104 
Niger’s court system also follows a familiar pattern.  There is a Supreme Court, 
based in the capital, Niamey, two courts of appeal, one in Niamey and one in Niger’s 
second city, Zinder, six regional tribunals distributed throughout the country, and twenty-
five judicial delegations that deal with smaller cases.105 
Beginning at independence and continuing through Niger’s recent law reforms,106 
Niger’s state legal system has embraced and legitimated certain aspect of what it refers to 
as droit coutumier, or “customary law.”107 Specifically, in matters concerning marriage, 
divorce, filiation, succession, gifts, testaments, and in certain matters concerning 
 
101 See supra Part II. 
102 See generally  Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12. 
103 See REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER, LA CONSTITUTION (1999) [hereinafter, Niger Constitution]. 
104 Id. 
105 See Mission d’Analyse supra note 12, at 7-11. 
106 See infra Part IV. 
107 Niger’s legitimization of customary law is in contrast to most post-colonial African nations, which tried 
to create uniform state legal systems by suppressing multifarious legal traditions at the time of 
independence. See Amadou Tankoano, Les Sources du Droit au Niger, in MODE DE PRODUCTION DES 
DROITS AFRICAINS ET COMMON LAW 133 (1995).   Some commentators distinguish the term 
“customary law” and “traditional law,” the former referring to the colonially invented law that state courts 
and other organs of the state apply, the latter referring to the law that is applied by traditional political and 
religious leaders completely apart from contact with any state organ.  See Abdourahaman Chaibou, Le 
Transfert Des Concepts du Droit Processuel Francais au Niger (June 1997) (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Orleans), at p. 22.  (on file with author). 
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commercial contracts and real property, judges may apply customary law to resolve 
disputes.108 Significantly for our purposes, the state does not permit the application of 
customary law in criminal matters.109 
On paper, and from our Western perspective, Niger’s legal system appears quite 
orderly and rational: it enshrines principles of individual and human rights, borrows the 
structure of Western legal systems, and honors non-Western legal traditions by carving 
out a limited domain for the application of “customary law.”  If this is how Niger’s 
contemporary legal system works, one might ask, what could be wrong with the current 
reforms, the goal of which is to update and modernize that system?  But that would 
assume that Niger’s contemporary law is actually that which is described in its written 
legal texts.  As the discussion below reveals, that is far from the case.  
2. The dominance of non-state law in Niger 
In fact, Niger’s legal system looks completely different from the perspective of 
most of its citizens.  To them, the rational and orderly system described above is 
 
108 See Article 51 of the Law 62-11of 16 march 1962, concerning the organization and competence of the 
jurisdictions of the Republic of Niger; see also Tankoano, supra note 107, at 133.  The law requires judges 
to set aside custom and instead apply state civil law if the custom is contrary to public order and the liberty 
of persons.  The court must also disregard custom where both parties request it, or where one party cannot 
take advantage of custom or has totally or partially renounced custom as an unequivocal act of will.  See 
Abdourahaman Chaibou, L’Influence de la Jurisprudence " Nigerienne en Droit de la Famille Sur la 
Coutume: Les Notions “D’Evolution Generale du Pays” et de “Coutume Urbaine »  REVUE 
NIGERIENNE DE DROIT 71 (No. 02, December 1999). 
109 See Article 78 of law 62-11of 16 March 1962.  Traditional chiefs also play an important role in the law, 
politics, and culture of contemporary Niger.  Unfortunately, all but a glancing treatment is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  For a dated but still relevant English language discussion of that topic, see Pearl 
Theodora Robinson, African Traditional Rulers and the Modern State: The Linkage Role of Chiefs in the 
Republic of Niger (1975) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University) (notes on file with 
author).  The chiefs’ participation in the law of contemporary Niger is confusing because they play two 
very distinct roles.  At times, they act as quasi-state administrators who are specifically empowered to 
conciliate in certain disputes; at other times acting as traditional leaders – completely unconnected to the 
state or its formal system of laws – to resolve disputes and achieve justice. See Abdourahaman Chaibou, 
Les Juges, le Cadis, le Chef et les Autres . . ., REVUE JURIDIQUE DU SAMAN (SYNDICAT 
AUTONOME DES MAGISTRATES DU NIGER) 5 (No. 001, July-August 1998); Abdourahaman 
Chaibou, Le Role des Juges Traditionnels Dans le Processus de Reglement des Conflits au Niger, in LE 
JUGE: UNE FIGURE D’AUTHORITE 138 (1996); Idrissa, supra note 63, at 24. 
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unknown and unknowable, and they come into contact with it rarely and only when 
absolutely necessary.110 
For most Nigeriens, particularly rural people, an obvious problem with the law of 
the state is that it is written in French, which an overwhelming majority does not 
understand.111 Even for francophone Nigeriens, the French culture of Niger’s state legal 
system presents insuperable barriers: lawyers, judges, and court personnel, many of 
whom are educated in France, dash about wearing long black robes and ceremonial 
ruffled collars, communicating to one another in technical legal terms, leaving the 
average Nigerien petitioner completely mystified.112 
Furthermore, Niger’s people view the state legal system as irreparably corrupt.113 
Those citizens who know anything at all about the state system know that one cannot get 
justice from it if one does not have money to offer the judge.114 
Even those rare citizens who desire contact with the state’s legal system have 
great difficulty because it is fatally under-resourced.  In 2002, there were 140 judges in 
the country, which translated at that time to approximately one judge for every 80,000 
 
110 Kelley, supra note 12, at 659 (arguing that rural Nigeriens rarely know or care about the content of state 
law); Tankoano, supra note 107, at 135, 137; Chaibou, L’Influence de la Jurisprudence, supra note 108, at 
71; Chegou, supra note 71, at 2; see Idrissa, supra note 63, at 26-27 (arguing Nigeriens today identify 
much more closely with their traditional rulers than with the Nigerien nation-state). 
111 Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 24; see supra notes 55, 56 and accompanying text. 
112 See Mahaman Tidjani Alou, La Petite Corruption au Niger, Etudes et Travaux No.3, (report published 
by Laboratoire d’Etudes et Recherches sur les Dynamiques Socials et le Development Local, January 2002) 
at p. 70 [check page #] (copy on file with the author); see also Garcon, supra note 82, at 28 (arguing most 
Nigeriens do not understand the functioning of the justice system). 
113 See Alou, supra note 112, at 23-35; Mahaman Tidjani Alou, La Justice au Plus Offrant, Les Infortune de 
Systeme Judiciaire en Afrique de L’Ouest (Autour de Cas de Niger), in POLOTIQUE AFRICAINE, LA 
CORRUPTION AU QUOTIDIEN 61 (Editions Karthala 22-24, No. 83, October, 2001); Alhada, supra 
note 6, at 80; Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 13 (stating corruption exists throughout Niger’s 
judiciary). 
114 Alou, supra note 113, at 64-66.  Influence peddling is another frequent form of corruption.  Although 
the independence of state judges is guaranteed by Articles 98 and 100 Niger’s Constitution, parties to legal 
proceedings often prevail by seeking intervention by politicians from the executive branch of government.  
The politicians phone the judges with instructions, and if the judges fail to obey, they find themselves 
assigned to backwater posts and stuck in the lower rungs of the civil service.  See Alou, supra note 113, at 
66; Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 11. 
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inhabitants.115 Lawyers are even harder to find.  In 2003, there were 77 lawyers116 
practicing in the entire country, and none of them maintained an office outside of 
Niamey.117 The courthouses and other government facilities where citizens might find a 
portal into the state legal system are widely disbursed and, with travel on public 
transportation beyond the means of most Nigeriens, virtually impossible to reach.118 The 
rare citizen who does find his or her way to a courthouse, encounters the most Spartan of 
conditions.  Most have no library, computers or even basic amenities such as telephone 
lines or usable office furniture.119 
Even if Nigeriens could overcome all of these barriers and shortcomings, the 
substance of the laws applied in the state courthouse would make little sense to them.  
The traditional, non-state law that most Nigeriens rely upon is premised on a culturally 
distinct notion of justice.  In the next section we will discuss specific examples of that 
traditional law – in particular the use of the gon oracle to identify wrongdoers and resolve 
disputes – but in preparation for that discussion we can run through a thumbnail sketch of 
traditional law. 
 First, traditional law in Niger is based on process, not rules.  Parties negotiate 
over just outcomes to their disputes.  There are flexible norms concerning who should 
participate in the negotiation, but in general it can be said that elders, traditional chiefs, 
 
115 Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 11 (adding that the World Bank norm is one judge for every 20,000 
inhabitants.) 
116 More precisely, there were 77 avocat, which in the French legal system is the rough equivalent of an 
American lawyer. 
117 Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 14; see also M. Aksar, Rentree Solonnele du Barreau de Niamey: 
Pour une Presence Plus Marquee des Avocats Dans la Vie de la Cite, L’EVENEMENT, March 1, 2005, at 
p. 5 (commenting on Niger’s scarcity of lawyers). 
118 See Garcon, supra note 82, at 28 (arguing many Nigeriens cannot afford to travel to cities to bring legal 
matters before judges); see also Alou, supra note 112, at 24. 
119 See Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 12-13; see also Interview with Judge Hasimiou, Niamey, 
Republic of Niger (December 16, 2003) (noting a lack of computers even in Niamey courthouses). 
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and respected spiritual leaders act as facilitators and guide the parties toward a just 
outcomes.   
In guiding the parties, the community leaders draw upon no fixed body of rules or 
precedent, and rarely if ever bring state law or Islamic sharia law into the discussion.  
Significantly, the leaders’ goal in these discussions is not to punish a wrongdoer, exact 
vengeance, or even protect the rights of the party who claims to have been injured.  
Rather, those leaders seek an outcome that will restore equilibrium to the social unit.   
Often, the process of restoring equilibrium to the village or extended family 
involves asking the perceived wrongdoer to compensate the victim for his loss, but as 
often as not, history will be invoked, and a victim’s request for compensation will be met 
with a reminder that his ancestor owed some debt of gratitude to the family of the 
wrongdoer, and that the victim can pay that debt by forbearing in this particular instance.  
Where the parties agree that immediate compensation is warranted, the victim generally 
is content to receive compensation from the wrongdoer’s family rather than from the 
wrongdoer himself because, once again, the point of the process is to restore the 
community, not punish the wrongdoer.     
Very much unlike the law of the West, Nigerien tradition makes no categorical 
distinction between public law and private law, nor does it conceptually separate criminal 
law from civil law.  Law is a process for establishing a modus vivendi for a community, 
and is inextricably interwoven with family relations, community relations, history, and 
spiritual beliefs.120 
120 Colleagues who are legal historians have pointed out that this description of traditional law in Niger, and 
indeed, of Niger’s present state of tension between traditional and state law, echoes a period during the 12th 
century in Europe when Roman law was being revived and applied at the expense of more traditional and 
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E. Summary 
Niger is an extremely poor, isolated country with dim prospects for significant 
economic development.  Due at least in part to its poverty and isolation, Niger’s 
traditional beliefs and practices have remained comparatively vibrant into the 21st 
century.  According to those beliefs, law is not a separate socio-cultural category, but is 
instead bound up with history and community relations and, in particular, with spiritual 
beliefs.   
Niger’s spiritual beliefs are a complex mixture of traditional spirit worship and 
Islam.  The country’s very tolerant brand of Islam permits unorthodox practices, 
including peoples’ reliance on mystical oracles to resolve disputes. 
Niger’s law looks completely different from the perspective of the state than from 
the perspective of most of its citizens.  To them, law is an open and flexible process for 
restoring harmony to their families and communities and is not a tool for enforcing 
individual rights or punishing individual wrongdoers. 
 Below, we will discuss specific examples of the law as it is understood and 
practiced by most Nigeriens. 
IV. The Use of the Gon Oracle in Niger 
The gon, first glimpsed in Part I.B., above, is only one example of traditional law 
employed by Nigeriens; in fact, it is only one of many oracles that Nigeriens rely upon.121 
localized Germanic law.  See generally John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 6-13 (2nd 
ed. 1985).   Fascinating as this parallel may be, I must leave it as a topic for future exploration. 
121 While the gon is considered Islamic, some Nigeriens rely on non-Islamic oracles to help resolve legal 
disputes.  The tarkama oracle, for example, is led by a traditional priest called the Magagin Duma who 
presides over a ceremony in which a goat is slaughtered and placed on a litter.  Four litter bearers hoist the 
goat carcass, which then leads them to the wrongdoer.  See Chegou, supra note 71, at 9-11.  A similar 
oracle, the tunguma, relies on a magic stone to lead its bearers to the guilty party.  Chegou, supra note 71, 
at 11 to 24.  Interestingly, ancient Egyptian oracles used a similar method, placing a figure of a deity on a 
litter that then would physically lead the litter bearers to the wrongdoer.  See Russ VerSteeg, The 
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We focus on it as emblematic of traditional Nigerien law for three reasons.  First, its use 
is widespread.  Second, it happened to be what Nigerines talked about when, years ago, I 
began posing general questions about theft and dispute resolution to ordinary, non-elite 
citizens.  Third, it furnishes a convenient contrast with Western law because the 
Washington Legal Consensus has made reform of the country’s Criminal Codes a 
priority, and at present the gon is what people are relying upon to cover the same ground.  
We begin our exploration of the gon with a brief discussion of how one goes about 
researching it.    
A.  Methodology of studying the gon.
Traditional law in Niger is not written, so one cannot hope to learn about it 
without venturing into the field to observe and ask about it.  My exploration of Niger’s 
legal traditions, particularly the gon, has relied on a mix of interviews and observation 
that took place during a year of fieldwork in Niger in 2003-2004 and during two month-
long visits in 2000 and 1996.   
In rural areas, most of the interviews I conducted were semi-structured group 
interviews, an unavoidable form of information gathering in small villages where adult 
men of noble birth feel entitled to insert themselves into all but the most intimate of 
conversations.  In the big city, Niamey, I was able to perform some one-on-one 
interviews and, on three occasions, witness the gon in action.122 
Machinery of Law in Pharaonic Egypt: Organization, Courts and Judges on the Ancient Nile, 9 Cardozo J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 129 (Spring, 2001).  There also are reports of oracles in Niger that involve sticking 
needles into chunks of soap, see Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 92, staring into water, 
drawing figures in the sand and scattering cowry shells, see Chegou, supra note 71, at 34, and 
administering poison to the suspected wrongdoer, see Arzika, supra note 67, at 129. 
122 For unknown reasons – perhaps because the novelty of my presence wore off or because I was reluctant 
to pay for the privilege – I was not invited to witness any gons after the initial three.  Though I spent much 
of my time in rural areas, I have never witnessed a rural gon for the simple reason that thefts and other 
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Nigeriens speak various languages, and grappling with them added a certain 
amount of extra work and imprecision to my study of the gon.123 But linguistic 
complications are merely the skin of a more profound methodological challenge: 
categorical confusion. Any attempt to understand and describe another culture risks 
skimming over the fact that different cultures categorize and understand the world 
differently.  A simple but important example of this categorical dissonance is my use of 
the word “law” throughout this paper.  As alluded to in our discussion of spiritual beliefs 
in Part III.B, above, Nigeriens, particularly rural Nigeriens, do not conceive of a separate 
socio-cultural category called “law” the way we in the West do.  For them, there is no 
conceptual division between “law” and the rest of their social and spiritual lives.  In fact, 
the Zarma language contains no word for “law.”124 Thus, when I use the terms “law” 
and “legal” in the parts of this paper that discuss Western law, I am using culturally 
appropriate descriptors, but when I use those words in discussions of traditional Nigerien 
“law,” I am in a sense cheating: falling back upon convenient, shorthand descriptions that 
our language and worldview include but theirs do not.125 
wrongs occur infrequently in small villages and, when they do, usually are resolved by means of mediation 
and negotiation. 
123 Most of the interviews were in Zarma, a language I speak and understand reasonably well.  Some 
interviews, particularly in the capital city, were in Hausa, of which I know nothing.   In all the interviews, I 
was aided by a collaborator, Bachir Tidiani, who is fluent in Zarma, Hausa, and French.  
124 When referring to that Western category, Zarmas usually fall back on French terms such as droit and 
justice. When I explain to rural Nigeriens our “law” category, the closest word they can produce in their 
language is chimi, which means simply “truth.” 
125 Another example is my use of the English word oracle to describe the gon and similar religio-magic 
rites that Nigerien people rely upon to identify wrongdoers. According to WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), oracle means 1(a)(2) “a typically ambiguous or enigmatic 
revelation or utterance believed to issue from a divinity through a medium (as a priest or priestess) thought 
to be inspired . . . 2(a)(1) a medium by which a pagan god reveals hidden knowledge or makes known the 
divine purpose.”  They do not use any similar categorical word, and instead refer to a given rite or 
ceremony by its proper name, in this case, gon. When we use the word oracle in English, it conjures 
visions of ancient, Roman priestesses in white flowing robes communicating with Olympian gods.  
Nigeriens, on the other hand, have no cultural history that explicitly or implicitly associates the gon or other 
rites with an ancient, revered civilization. 
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Where mystical phenomena are involved, the potential for categorical confusion 
is greater still.  This is because oracles, magic and the occult, all of which are employed 
in traditional law, occupy fundamentally different positions in Western versus African 
worldviews.  To Westerners, these subjects are exotic and supernatural; they are the stuff 
of fireside ghost stories that send tingles up listeners’ spines.126 But to most Nigeriens, 
such phenomena are mundane.127 The Zarma language does not include a word for 
“supernatural,”128 because to them, magical and mystical phenomena are perfectly 
natural.129 The only mystery concerns how and when actors in that realm will intrude 
upon and affect, positively or negatively, the lives of mortals.130 
The reality of such categorical dissonance can lead to a fascinating debate about 
whether it is legitimate, or indeed possible, for an outsider to presume to understand and 
describe the culture, or for that matter the law, of an “other.”  I intend to sidestep that 
debate.131 In this paper, I have attempted and will attempt to minimize categorical 
 
126 The Western Press delights in reporting the mystical beliefs of Africans.  See e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, A
Ghost Story Turns Very Scary for Malawi Journalists, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2005, at A4 (reporting 
Malawians’ belief that their president had fled from his palace because it was haunted by spirits); Denise 
Grady, Deadly Virus Alters Angola’s Traditions, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2005, at _ (noting that funerals 
must be conducted according to tradition to avoid neglecting spirits who might turn vengeful); Michael 
Wines, Rain Queen is Dead, but Debate Over Her Power Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at A2 
(discussing the death of a South African queen whose family is widely believed to have the power to 
produce rainfall). 
127 John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in 
Postcolonial South Africa, 29 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 513, 524 (Summer, 2004); E.E. Evans-
Pritchard, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE 64-68, 80-83 (1968). 
128 Jean-Pierre Olvier de Sardan, Occultism and the Ethnographic ‘I’: the Exoticizing of Magic from 
Durkheim to ‘Postmodern Anthropology,’ CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 13 (SAGE London, 
Vol. 13(1): 5-25).  Zarma’s refer to the spirit world as ganji or “bush,” which hints at their conception of 
that realm.  Designating it as “bush” assigns it a temporal and spiritual location outside the structured life of 
the village but still very much connected to it.  The village, kwara, is where relations and social outcomes 
are subject to human control and agency.  The bush, which begins just beyond the village’s fields, is a place 
where life is not ordered and mortals enjoy no domain, especially after dark. 
129 Id. at 11. 
130 See id. 
131 For a sample of works that engages this topic and recounts the evolution of post-modern anthropology, 
see WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & 
George E. Marcus eds., 1986); George E. Marcus and Michael M. J. Fisher, ANTHROPOLOGY AS A 
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confusion by pointing out differences between Nigerien and Western cultural categories, 
and by flagging for the reader the instances where I am sacrificing cultural accuracy for 
the sake of ease and conceptual clarity.132 Before leaving behind this discussion of 
categorical dissonance, it is worth noting that Washington Legal Consensus reformers 
evince no understanding of the possibility that the “law” they seek to impose is not a 
familiar or appropriate category for the societies upon which they are acting.  
B. The gon
During my recent year of fieldwork in Niger, I collected accounts of sixteen gon
oracles, eleven of which took place in the Zongo neighborhood of Niamey.133 The first 
gon I observed was described in Part I.B, above.  Below, I will provide descriptions of 
another Zongo gon I witnessed, and, in the course of analyzing those gons, refer to 
illustrative cases from among the many secondhand accounts I have collected. 
The origin of the gon is obscure.134 Unlettered rural people generally insist that 
the entire procedure for the gon is laid out in detail in the Koran.  This is not the case.  
 
CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986).  For a 
readable and entertaining rendition of the same, see Clifford Geertz, WORKS AND LIVES: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGIST AS AUTHOR (1988), particularly that collection’s final essay, Being Here: Whose 
Life is it Anyway?, at pages 129-149. 
132 Others have pointed out challenges faced by Western researchers who attempt to describe mystical 
phenomena.  The venerable E. E. Evans Pritchard, when writing about witchcraft and oracles among the 
Zande people of the Sudan, noted that the researcher feels the need to supply his Western readers with an 
account of the mystical phenomenon that is orderly and rational when that which is observed often is 
neither and when, to most Westerners, the very notion of using magic or consulting oracles is the 
quintessence of irrationality.  See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 16, at 82; see also Peter Winch, 
Understanding Primitive Society in PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICA, A READER IN CULTURE, 
HISTORY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 1, at 312; Jean Rouch, LA RELIGION ET LA MAGIE 
SONGHAY 39 (2d. ed. 1989) (1960). 
133 My emphasis in this paper on gon oracles that took place in Niamey’s Zongo neighborhood provides 
what is perhaps a skewed sampling because the urban Zongo gon has regular interaction with the state 
police and court system while rural gon practitioners and parties rely almost exclusively on the oracle to 
identify wrongdoers and rarely have any contact with the state system.  In spite of this paper’s emphasis on 
the Zongo gon, a majority of gon accounts I have recorded took place in rural villages.  I reported a few of 
these at Kelley, supra note 12, at 673-680. 
134 See infra note 95 for a discussion of whether oracles and other mystical phenomena in contemporary 
West Africa can justly be described as pre-Islamic.  My primary interest is in the role that the gon plays in 
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One Nigerien scholar of Arabic language and Islam told me that he is quite sure that the 
gon was adapted from pre-Islamic practice and that the ritual incantations that once 
accompanied it were simply replaced by the reading of Koranic verses.135 This may be 
true, but that scholar could point to no particular reason for assuming it to be so and knew 
of no research that had been performed on the subject.136 A learned marabout from the 
holy city of Say in Niger dismissed the gon entirely, saying it was merely a children’s 
game that had caught on among naïve people in Niger.137 We thus can only speculate 
about the origins of the gon, but can say with certainty that today it is practiced widely, at 
least throughout southwestern Niger,138 and that the gon of the Zongo neighborhood in 
Niamey is widely considered to be the “standard.”139 
The Zongo neighborhood was founded and populated long ago by piously Islamic 
Hausa traders.  In the 1960s, Malam Hassan, a resident of Zongo, was the most important 
Islamic leader in Niamey.  He maintained a Koranic school that drew students from 
 
contemporary Nigerien legal culture and law, and so I prefer to avoid any debate about whether it is, as 
some maintain, an animist “holdover” sporting a thin veneer of Islam. 
135 Interview with Dr. Moulaye Hassane, Niamey, Republic of Niger (November 19, 2003); Interview with 
Dr. Moulaye Hassane, Niamey, Republic of Niger (February 16, 2004).  During an interview with the 
Sarkin of Zongo he once mentioned that the gon was based on a pre-Islamic, animist practice called dongo. 
I pressed him for more details, but when he saw my enthusiasm for this line of questioning, he impatiently 
declined to give further information.  Although I asked others about the significance of dongo, I received 
no further information.  See Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11. 
136 See Interview with Dr. Moulaye Hassane (November 19, 2003), supra note 135. 
137 Interview with the President of the Islamic Association and the Cadis of Say, Say, Republic of Niger 
(February 25, 2004). 
138 My fieldwork has focused on this region.  While it is clear that the gon is widespread in this zone, I am 
less certain that it is widely practiced in other parts of Niger.  I have heard accounts of the gon being 
performed in other regions of Niger and in other countries in West Africa, but people from southwestern 
Niger were always involved, leaving it unclear whether the gon was indigenous to those other areas.  See, 
for example, Interview with village chief and a group of elders, Saabu Dey, Republic of Niger (December 
18, 2003)(recounting a gon that took place among Zarma men who were living temporarily in Mali).  I also 
have seen a reference to the gon being performed in Diffa, which is near Niger’s eastern boarder, more than 
a thousand kilometers distant from Zongo.  Chaibou, supra note 107, at 446.  One last bit of evidence 
arguing for the widespread use of the gon is that the Sarkin of Zongo claims that it is of Hausa origin, 
which would place it in central and eastern Niger.  See Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11. 
139 See Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 92; Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 
11; see generally Chegou, supra note 71, at 57-62; Chaibou, Le Role Des Juges Traditionnels, supra note 
109, at 145.  
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around the region.  In 1964, he suggested to the grandfather of the present Sarkin of 
Zongo that they should begin reading the gon there.140 The Zongo gon’s reputation for 
accuracy spread rapidly, and soon people were traveling from far and wide to consult it.  
Taking advantage of the Zongo gon’s perceived infallibility, Niamey law enforcement 
officials regularly sent parties to Zongo to determine culpability and resolve disputes.141 
Two principal actors animate the Zongo gon: the Sarkin of Zongo and the Zongo 
marabout. The present Sarkin was born in 1954 and was chosen by acclamation to lead 
the community when his father died in 1993.142 Today he acts as the traditional chief for 
the Zongo neighborhood, convening elders to decide neighborhood policy, organizing 
communal labor projects, helping conciliate when families or individuals fall into 
conflict, and collecting taxes that he sends on to Niger’s central government.  In addition 
to his other duties, it is his traditional obligation to preside over the gon oracle.
When parties approach the Sarkin with a request to submit their dispute or 
question to the gon he must decide whether the request is appropriate.  Occasionally, he 
refuses to perform the gon, when, for example, the identity of the transgressor is already 
certain based on the circumstances.  He says that the power of the gon is too great and the 
physical danger to the marabout is too extreme to perform the gon when it is not truly 
needed.  When he determines that the gon is appropriate, he presides over the preliminary 
 
140 Although the Sarkin did not state it directly, he implied that the gon was known to exist elsewhere 
before it became common practice in the Zongo neighborhood in 1964. 
141 See infra note 160. 
142 The Sarkin’s family history is based upon Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11.  Before 
becoming Sarkin, Hamza worked as a bank’s accountant in a now largely abandoned skyscraper that towers 
over the northwestern end of the Zongo neighborhood.  
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gathering of facts, guides all parties through the various oaths they must utter, and, 
ultimately, poses precisely framed questions to the oracle. 143 
The second principle actor in the Zongo gon is the current head marabout of the 
neighborhood mosque, Oumarou Alzuma.144 He is in his fifties, but he does not know his 
exact age.  At thirteen, he left his natal village and began his religious studies under a 
highly respected marabout who was distantly related to his family.  After six years of 
rigorous Koranic study, he moved to the holy city of Say and spent several more years 
under the tutelage of important Islamic religious leaders.  Around the year 1970, he 
sought and was granted the position of acolyte to Malam Hamisou, a marabout of great 
reputation who was based in Zongo.  Over the years he became the Malam’s trusted 
colleague and confidant, eventually moving into the great man’s home.  Along with other 
junior marabouts, Oumarou led prayers in the Zongo mosque, created Islamic charms and 
incantations that warded off ill fortune and healed the sick, and, on behalf of pious 
petitioners, sought God’s favor for advantageous business relations, safe travel, or 
strength against enemies.   
In approximately 2001, the master of the Zongo gon died, and the Malam initiated 
Oumarou into its power and its secrets.  Oumarou will not discuss the secrets he learned 
or exactly what sort initiation he experienced, but he will share the fact that the gon is 
both powerful and dangerous, and that he must be strong and of pure mind and body to 
avoid being harmed by it.  
 
143 When the Sarkin is called away from the neighborhood, usually to take care of administrative business 
arising from his government sanctioned position as chef de quartier, or neighborhood chief, his younger 
brother, Boubacar, stands in and presides over the gon.
144 Unless otherwise noted, all of the information in the following paragraphs regarding the Zongo 
marabout comes from Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 92. 
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Today, it is rare that more than a day goes by without a request for a gon. The 
majority of cases involve theft, but people sometimes consult the gon for other reasons.  
For example, not long ago there was a man who had two wives.  He caught a “social 
disease” even though he had not had sexual relations outside of marriage.  The gon
identified the transgressor.  Also, it sometimes happens that a child falls ill and the 
parents suspect sorcery.  They consult the gon to determine who has cast the evil spell.145 
Recently, missing cellular telephones have become the most common reason that people 
consult the Zongo gon.146 
1. Second example of Nigerien traditional law: the gon oracle 
confirms the identity of a petty thief.147 
The second gon I witnessed in Zongo was presided over by the Sarkin’s younger 
brother, Boubacar.148 When I arrived at the Sarkin’s compound preliminary discussions 
had already taken place and the interested parties had gathered in a courtyard to consult 
the oracle.149 Three young men were present, all who appeared to be in their early to mid 
twenties, one who had been severely beaten.  His clothing was stained with blood, his 
face had open gashes, and his eyes and lips were badly swollen.  There were also two 
middle-aged men in attendance.  Each was dressed in professional garb and, judging by 
their comportment and their fluency in French, both were educated.   
A theft had brought them to Zongo that day.  One of the young men maintained 
an informal business in Niamey selling cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, aspirin, and 
 
145 See Interview with Hamza Maman Bako, supra note 11. 
146 Cell phone us is spreading rapidly in Niger because cellular technology permits the country to leapfrog 
past its antiquated communications infrastructure.       
147 The entire description is based on Zongo Field Notes 00004, Niamey, Republic of Niger (June 12, 
2004). 
148 See supra note 143. 
149 The Sarkin’s compound was under construction, which forced this gon from the mud room where the 
first one had taken place to an uncovered courtyard.   
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other sundries from a small table that he set up next to a road in his community.  Some 
goods disappeared from his table, and he suspected the bloodied man of taking them.  At 
first, the table seller and his brother (the third young man who was present) took the 
suspect to the police station where he confessed to the theft and agreed to pay 
compensation.  But on the way back to their neighborhood the suspect changed his mind 
saying he had confessed only because he was afraid of the police.  The retraction, and the 
anger it caused, led to his beating.   
The table seller and his brother offered to resolve the issue by coming to Zongo to 
consult the gon, and apparently the suspect agreed.  The two older men were “witnesses,” 
who had tried to mediate the disagreement back in their community and now had come to 
participate in the gon.
Two boys – both Koranic students from the Zongo neighborhood studying under 
marabout Oumarou – began preparing for the gon oracle by rolling out the plastic prayer 
rug, kneeling to face one another, and peeling off their shirts. The older of the two boys 
was involved in the first gon, described in Part I.B, above, but the other boy I had not 
seen before.150 The marabout arrived, squatted with his back against a mud wall, and 
opened his embossed Koran in preparation for reading the yassina. 
As the ceremony was about to begin, Boubacar raised with one of the older men 
the topic of payment.  After a brief discussion in Hausa (which I did not understand), he 
 
150 See Zongo Field Notes 00005, Niamey, Republic of Niger (June 14, 2004).  The Zongo marabout, 
Oumarou, reported that presently there are six different boys who hold the reeds for the Zongo gon 
ceremony.  All of them are his Koran students, and none of them receives any special training for the gon. 
They participate in the gon when they are needed and available, and they do not work in pre-established 
teams.   
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turned to address the younger men and, in Zarma, said wo kanda zambar fo, or, “give me 
5,000 CFA.” 151 One of the young men dug a bill out of his pocket and handed it over.   
 Having collected the fee, Boubacar instructed the three young men to stand.  He 
asked them their names, at which point the younger brother of the table seller nervously 
told him that “the things that were stolen were not mine, they were his,” pointing to the 
older brother.  He looked over his shoulder toward the benches and seemed to be hoping 
that he would be dismissed from the proceeding.  Boubacar replied that he was a part of 
this too, and that he had nothing to fear so long as they told the truth. 
 Boubacar then approached the three young men and led the injured one toward 
the kneeling, shirtless Koran students.  He compelled the injured young man to bend at 
the waist and place his hand between the reeds, which the boys where holding in place 
with their fingers.  As they maintained their positions, Boubacar led the injured man 
through a recitation in Hausa that was designed to limit the focus on the gon and invoke 
its power to identify the author of the crime.  When Boubacar was done, the marabout 
began reading the yassina aloud and the boys removed their fingers from the reeds.  They 
immediately bowed inward, indicating that the beaten young man was guilty of the theft.  
To be certain, Boubacar repeated the entire process.  Again, the reeds immediately bent 
inward.  The expression on the beaten young man’s face did not change.  He waited 
impassively to be dismissed, and when he was, walked back to his wooden bench and sat 
down. 
 
151 At that time, 5,000 CFA equaled approximately $10, a princely sum in a country where more than half 
the population lives off of less than one dollar per day.  However, the fact that the Sarkin demands payment 
for the gon is not remarkable from a Nigerien perspective.  Custom demands that marabouts and zimas be 
paid for the services they render.  In my experience, there usually is no set fee.  The practitioner asks the 
client to pay whatever he thinks the service is worth.  As indicated in note 122, above, I expressed 
reluctance to pay the Sarkin for the privilege of observing the gon, and by thus heeding my own cultural 
bias, probably unnecessarily limited my opportunities for direct observation. 
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 Having obtained an answer from the gon, the two young men and the two older 
men huddled with Boubacar to decide what should be done with the gon evidence.  The 
older men agreed to remonstrate with the thief to compensate the table seller and avoid 
further trouble.  If he refused, they all agreed, they would have to return to the police 
station to inform the officials that the gon had verified the suspect’s guilt.   
 2. Further observations about the gon
From a Western perspective, perhaps the most surprising feature of the gon oracle 
is that a broad swath of the population considers it infallible.  The parties themselves, 
including those found culpable, generally accept the gon’s determination without protest.  
In the descriptions provided above, as well as in the third gon that I witnessed, all of the 
accused parties accepted and admitted their guilt once the gon had spoken.  This 
acceptance was most striking in the first gon example, where the two wives, with their 
extended families in support, maintained their innocence loudly and angrily until the 
moment the gon delivered its verdict, at which time each admitted publicly that she had 
been caught.   In fact, in the dozens of descriptions of gon ceremonies I have heard over 
the years, only two concluded with the identified author of the wrong continuing to deny 
his guilt.152 In both of those cases, in accordance with the traditionally accepted norm of 
group responsibility for social harms153 the families of the accused agreed to compensate 
the victims in spite of the individuals’ continuing denials.154 
152 Interview with Yaye Iday, Gassangourni Maigari, Hassan Djibou, and Hamidou Gassangourni, Fandou 
Berri, Republic of Niger (November 14, 2003) (recounting a case where a Fulani herder was accused of 
stealing livestock but maintained his innocence); Interview with group of villagers, Fandou Berri, (May 22, 
2000 (evening)) (recounting an instance where a young man of bad reputation denied stealing money in 
spite of being found guilty by a gon). 
153 See supra part III.D.2. 
154 Interview with Yaye Iday, Gassangourni Maigari, Hassan Djibou, and Hamidou Gassangourni, supra 
note 152; Interview with group of villagers (May 22, 2000 (evening)), supra note 152. 
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In addition to the almost uniform acquiescence of those found guilty by the gon, a
broad cross section of Nigeriens, many of whom are aware of Western skepticism about 
mystical phenomena, offer stories to illustrate its infallibility.  According to one such 
story, a Nigerien man who was living in Cote d’Ivoire many years ago sent a large 
amount of money back to his natal village in the care of a group of young men.  He sent 
the money with detailed written instructions on how to distribute it, but when village 
elders attempted to carry out the instructions they found that there was not enough money 
in the package, and they assumed that the youthful couriers had stolen it.  The village 
chief ordered a gon, which determined that all of the youths were innocent.  Later, the 
man sent apologies from Cote d’Ivoire that he had mistakenly enclosed too little money.  
To the villagers, this story furnished conclusive proof that the gon would never assign 
blame incorrectly.155 
In another testament to the gon’s infallibility, my collaborator, Bachir Tidiani, 
told me with delight that several years ago a television station in Niamey did an 
investigative report of the Zongo gon to test its accuracy.  Station employees fabricated a 
story about a theft and took it to the Sarkin of Zongo, who approved a reading of the gon.
The oracle tested each of the suspects but “trapped” no one, proving its infallibility.156 
It is a remarkable sign of the gon’s widespread acceptance in Nigerien culture that 
stories endorsing its power and accuracy come from across the socio-economic spectrum.  
In the numerous cases recounted to me by rural peasant farmers, I have never heard a 
whisper of doubt that the result of a properly conducted gon is anything other than a 
verdict handed down directly from God.  But unlettered rural people are not the only ones 
 
155 Interview with group of villagers, Fandou Berri, Republic of Niger (May 26, 1996); Kelley, supra note 
12, at 678 and n. 162. 
156See Chegou, supra note 71, at 61 (also referring to this story).
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who believe in the gon’s power to reveal truth in the context of legal disputes. In the 
second gon example, for example, the witnesses who attended the gon and then 
participated in negotiating the resolution were educated, sophisticated urbanites.  They 
neither expressed nor exhibited any skepticism about the oracle.  
Other highly educated people endorse the gon, often accompanied by a shrug of 
the shoulders and a statement to the effect of “I don’t know how it works, only that it 
does.”  One Nigerien man who had earned his PhD from Boston University recounted a 
story from his youth in which he was accused of stealing a watch.  With his honor at 
stake, he insisted on consulting the gon oracle. He and his companions found a marabout 
willing to perform the ceremony, and at the critical moment the reeds bent outward 
proving his innocence.  Based on the gon evidence, his accuser apologized.157 Still 
another highly educated and worldly Nigerien professor told me that when he was a 
middle school student in Niamey in the early 1960s the teachers from the middle school – 
all of them French nationals – would order a gon performed whenever anything of value 
disappeared.  It never failed to identify the responsible party.158 
In addition to the deeply held belief in its infallibility, there are practical reasons 
why Nigeriens rely on the gon. One is that it permits them to steer questions of law and 
justice toward traditional leaders who are thought to be purer of heart than the distant, 
foreign and corrupt actors of the state legal system.159 Although people in the city 
sometimes bring their theft accusations and other legal matters to the police,160 it is much 
 
157 Interview with Boubacar Assoumi, Niamey, Republic of Niger (December 2, 2003). 
158 Interview with Professor Sidikou Harouna, supra note 35.
159 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
160 As illustrated by the second gon example, the oracle’s relationship to the state system of justice can be 
complex in urban areas where people find themselves in close proximity to the police and courts.  Niger’s 
current state law does not permit judges and courts to rely on oracles and other forms of mystical evidence 
to resolve accusations of theft or other crimes. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.  But in 
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more common for parties, particularly in rural areas, to ignore the state system altogether 
and rely on legal actors they understand and trust.161 The first gon example provides a 
typical example.  There, the parties never considered consulting any state legal authority.  
The husband who suspected his wives of thieving worked his way through various 
traditional channels of dispute resolution, consulting with family elders, traditional 
community leaders, and finally the Zongo gon oracle.  Neither he nor any of the many 
vocal and agitated actors in the dispute ever so much as whispered the possibility of 
referring the dispute to the state system of justice. 
Another practical reason why Nigeriens rely on the gon rather than the state legal 
system is that the oracle is speedy while the state is not.  The gon succeeds in restoring 
order and harmony to Nigeriens’ families and communities in part because it renders 
justice quickly.  Relying on the gon, disputants can make their accusations, resolve vital 
questions of fact, determine guilt, and negotiate a resolution, all in the course of an 
afternoon, leaving no time for bitterness and rancor to fester and irreversibly damage the 
community.162 Indeed, in the two gon examples, the accusations, the consultation with 
the Zongo oracle, and negotiation over resolutions, all took place within the same 24 hour 
 
spite of this prohibition, police, prosecutors, and judges routinely take gon evidence into consideration and 
often send parties to the gon to determine the author of an alleged wrong.  The government itself 
acknowledges that some state judges “forget” to apply state law and instead base their rulings in petty 
criminal matters on traditional law.  See Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 27.  Other judges consciously 
skirt the prohibition by arguing that the state legal system requires them to attempt conciliation between the 
parties before pursuing any formal charges.  The gon evidence, those judges say, is permitted only as a part 
of the conciliation phase, whether the judicial officers encourage the parties to seek it out or merely take 
into consideration as traditional evidence that the parties have already procured.  Of course, any distinction 
between the conciliation phase of a case and the official investigation and prosecution is entirely lost on 
most Nigeriens.  See Interview with Judge Hasimiou, supra note 119 (expressing the view that if irrational 
evidence helps the parties resolve their disputes in the conciliation phase, so be it).  
161 See Kelley, supra note 12, at 659 (most Nigeriens ignore and avoid state law). 
162 Interview with Garba Sidikou, Chef de Canton of Kouray and Secretary General of the Association of 
Traditional Chiefs of Niger, Niamey, Republic of Niger (December 17, 2003) (stating that speed is the 
essence of traditional justice in Niger). 
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period.  This is in stark contrast to the state legal system, which routinely takes years to 
resolve the simplest of disputes.163 
These practical considerations help explain why the gon is popular among 
Nigeriens seeking justice, but there are also more nuanced reasons why so many choose 
to rely on it to the exclusion of the state system.  From our Western perspective, 
understanding those subtler reasons is aided if we realize that, though the oracle may in 
some respects appear to take the place of a Western trial, in fact its role in traditional law 
is quite different.   
Unlike a trial, which takes place after the parties have failed to negotiate a 
settlement and which ideally represents a final determination of a legal dispute, 
consulting a gon oracle represents an intermediate stage in a process of negotiating a 
livable resolution to the dispute.  In almost all instances, before seeking out the gon, 
individuals who feel that they are the victims of wrongs, along with their immediate and 
extended families, have already attempted to resolve their disputes through negotiation 
and mediation of the sort described in Part III.D.2, above.  Typically, where family elders 
have failed to resolve the dispute, the parties have sought the intervention of some supra-
family traditional authority, usually a village chief or a respected marabout.164 Only after 
those steps have been exhausted do the parties resort to the gon.
And the consultation with the gon oracle is rarely the end of the process.  
Typically, the gon results are considered another – if vital and irrefutable – piece of 
 
163 See Interview with Nouhu Sauni, Village Chief of Gassangourni, Gassangourni, Republic of Niger 
(October 28, 2003) (describing a land dispute that had wended its way through various state forums for a 
decade, and in which a man who had been jailed had sat in prison for more than a year without a hearing); 
Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at. 
164 As discussed note 160, above, in the city the police and state justice authorities sometimes constitute an 
intermediate step. 
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evidence to be taken into account in the negotiation between the victim, the accused, their 
families and their community.  For example, the first gon example ended with an 
extended huddle between the elders and a determination that the parties should return to 
the traditional authorities in their community to negotiate a satisfactory conclusion by 
which all of the parties could continue to live together in harmony.  In the second gon
example, the older professional men in attendance filled the role of elders by urging the 
guilty party to admit his guilt, compensate the victim, and avoid further trouble.  In the 
vast majority of cases, once the gon has conclusively identified the wrongdoer in a legal 
matter, there follows a relatively brief discussion, facilitated by traditional authority 
figures, where the wrongdoer and his family agree to pay some combination of material 
and symbolic compensation to the aggrieved party, and the matter ends there. 
Consulting the gon oracle is also unlike a Western trial in that the post-gon
resolution of the matter does not involve punishing the identified wrongdoer with a fine 
or jail at the conclusion of the proceeding.165 Instead, the resolution normally involves 
negotiated compensation for the injured party (oftentimes paid, at least in part, by the 
wrongdoer’s family or lineage group) and a symbolic welcoming of the wrongdoer’s 
family back into the community.166 Often, the essence of the resolution prescribed by the 
 
165 There is a vague threat of supernatural sanction from the gon, but the potential for harm seems to be 
related to the person’s purity and honesty in approaching the oracle and appears to have little to do with 
whether the person is guilty or innocent of the alleged wrong.  Due this vague threat of harm parties 
sometimes confess before submitting to the oracle.  See, e.g., Interview with Boubacar Bako, Niamey, 
Republic of Niger (June 9, 2004) (recounting an instance where a suspected thief confessed to avoid 
submitting to the gon); Interview with Oumarou Alzuma, supra note 92 (recounting a case involving a 
stolen cell phone where one person in a group of potential suspects confessed rather than participate in the 
gon); see also Interview with various elders, Fandou Berri and Gassangourni, Republic of Niger 
(November 18, 2003) (a rural farmer indicating that the gon is so powerful, particularly when combined 
with blood sacrifice, that it can kill people). 
166 Kelley, supra note 12, at 677-79. 
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elders is a combination of an apology and a modus vivendi for the broader community.167 
The role of the gon is to provide clear, reliable facts that permit the parties, their families, 
and their communities, to break the logjam and move toward restoration of community 
harmony.  
Finally, although it may be stating the obvious, the gon is popular among the 
people of Niger because if provides them with a form of law that is organically adapted to 
the rest of their culture.  According to Niger’s vibrant traditional beliefs, law, spirituality, 
and community are considered parts of an undifferentiated whole.168 Because Nigerien 
people view the world in this categorically unified way, the gon and similar forms of 
“law” that draw upon religion and the spirit realm, and that are geared toward 
maintenance of community harmony, make perfect sense. 
4. Summary 
Before concluding with some predictions of how the Washington Legal 
Consensus will play out in Niger and some suggestions about a more appropriate way to 
carry out reform of Niger’s legal system, we review what we have learned thus far. 
From the point of view of the Washington Legal Consensus, state law reform in 
Niger is a long overdue housekeeping project.  Niger must reform its law to keep up with 
changes in technology, business, and evolving conceptions of human rights.  It also must 
eliminate the multifarious legal traditions that operate, largely unregulated and 
unsupervised, around the country and impose a uniform, predictable legal regime.  
Without such modernizing changes, Niger will repel capital investment and continue to 
suffer crushing poverty.  According to the legal reformers, this process of burnishing and 
 
167 See id. at 677-679. 
168 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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updating Niger’s law should create no abrupt change in Nigeriens’ lives because the 
country’s legal system has been based on Western law (specifically the French variety) 
since independence. 
The picture looks very different from the perspective most Nigeriens.  They view 
Western state law as unappealing and of limited utility not only because it is 
incomprehensible, inconveniently remote, expensive, slow and corrupt, but because it 
asks the wrong questions and produces the wrong results.  In the realm of petty theft, 
where we have focused our inquiry, most Nigeriens would wonder how the state system 
could possibly be confident that it identified the source of the wrong without consulting 
the spiritual realm.  Once the guilty party is identified, state law again moves in the 
wrong direction.  Traditional law demands that the wrongdoer be situated within his 
extended family group, and that the group have a chance to restore and defend its honor 
by negotiating a modus vivendi with the rest of the community, including the family of 
the victim.  Focusing the legal inquiry only on the wrongdoer and the legal remedy only 
on the victim, as the state system does, completely misses the point of restoring harmony 
to the larger social unit.  Finally, the idea of punishing the wrongdoer by carting him off 
to jail is viewed by most Nigeriens as absurd.  Why on earth, they would ask, would you 
remove that person from the community and thereby injure his family, including his 
ancestors and his descendants, making permanent the tear in the social fabric?    
If the gon and similar legal rites play a central role in Niger’s most commonly 
subscribed system of justice, if it is widely accepted as legitimate and infallible, if it is 
speedy, if it is perfectly consistent with most peoples’ cultural beliefs and practices, and 
if it is efficacious as a tool for restoring community harmony, does it make sense to 
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permit Washington Consensus legal reformers to abruptly eliminate it?  That is the 
question we will briefly explore in the concluding section. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has described the legal traditions that most people in Niger follow, and 
has cast doubt on the wisdom of abruptly displacing those traditions by means of 
Washington Legal Consensus reform.  But that does not mean that all attempts to change 
Niger’s law are misguided, or that the West can play no useful role in facilitating the 
development of Niger’s legal system. 
The law is not a static.  As time passes, the law that Nigeriens live by will change 
whether or not the change is being pushed by Western legal reformers.169 The gon itself 
illustrates the evolving nature of law, for although we refer to it in this paper as a form of 
“traditional law,” we know that it probably was not widely practiced, at least not in its 
present form, until the 20th century when Nigerien society as a whole was moving toward 
an embrace of Islam.  There is little doubt that such natural change in the law would 
continue, even in the absence of Washington Consensus pressure.  For example, it seems 
a safe prediction that over time, if Niger were to increase its rate of literacy and its 
connections to the global economy, reliance on magio-religious legal practices such as 
the gon would naturally fade, and more secular and rational legal practices would take 
root. 
If Niger’s law is bound to change over time, there is nothing wrong and much 
right with encouraging movement toward transparency, consistency, predictability, and 
dedication to human rights.  Recent history indicates that such qualities tend to engender 
 
169 See Berry, supra note 65, at 1. 
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long-term political stability.170 Furthermore, it is at least conceivable that the World 
Bank and the IMF are right that stable, rational, Western-style laws eventually will spur 
long-term economic development in Niger, although past experience and present 
economic indicators provide ample grounds for skepticism.171 Finally, if individual and 
human rights become embedded in Nigerien law, significant portions of the population, 
most notably women, descendants of slaves, and ethnic minorities, could find their status 
significantly elevated.  
This paper’s conclusion, therefore, is not that the Nigerien state should eschew 
legal reform and leave the resolution of all legal disputes to oracles and the traditional 
leaders who control them.  It is that Nigerien law reformers and their Western sponsors 
have gone about reform in an unwise fashion.  They should pay closer heed to the legal 
traditions they are displacing, and they should find a way to legitimate the new by 
affecting a gradual transition.  Before outlining a few concrete suggestions for more 
effective law reform in Niger, I offer a prediction regarding what will happen if the 
government and its Western sponsors continue down their present Washington Legal 
Consensus path.   
One possibility is that the government of Niger will continue to promulgate 
Western style laws but not follow through with aggressive steps to end its citizens’ 
reliance on practices such as the gon. If this happens, the Consensus reforms will end up 
as no more than words on paper, much like the French law that nominally has ruled the 
 
170 See Francis N. Botchway, Good Governance: The Old,The New, The Principle, and the Elements, 13 
Fla. J. Int’l L. 159, 189-96 (Spring 2001) (discussing the connection between democracy and political 
stability in developing countries); John Linarelli, Peace Building, 24 DENV. J. INT’L  & POL’Y 253, 256-
7 (Spring 1996) (same). 
171 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (expressing doubt about prospects for economic 
development). 
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country since independence.  Such a course will accomplish none of its putative goals of 
creating an attractive environment for capital investment and establishing due process 
and individual rights, because most people, particularly the uneducated majority living 
outside of large cities, will simply continue to ignore the state law.  If we assume that law 
reform and modernization is a desirable outcome, then this course will be harmful 
because it will reinforce the social and cultural gulf that separate the state of Niger and its 
laws from most of its citizens. 
 Another possibility is that Niger will carry out its stated plans to aggressively 
suppress practices such as the gon, as many in the government and the evolue leadership 
class believe it should.  But the consequences of this path will be at least as negative.  
Communities, particularly rural communities, that exist today under conditions of 
extreme privation, will suffer.  At present they are held together as functioning, 
sustaining, cooperative social units by means of the gon and other interconnected 
historical, social, spiritual and legal traditions.  If these traditions that resolve rips in the 
social fabric are suppressed, the Washington Legal Consensus will fail to fill the resulting 
void, at least in the short and medium term.  As discussed in Part III.D.2, above, it will 
fail for the practical reason that resources do not and will not at any time in the 
foreseeable future exist to implement Consensus law outside of cities.  More 
fundamentally, it will fail because Nigerien people, even if they could gain access to 
Western law, would not be willing to rely on it because it is premised on fundamentally 
foreign and distasteful notions about the nature of law and justice.  In sum, my prediction 
is that eliminating traditional law in Niger will create a void into which social unrest, 
rather than Western law, will creep. 
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For those who wish to encourage Niger to develop a predictable and consistent 
state legal system but who do not wish to eliminate overnight the traditions that underpin 
the country’s social cohesion, there is another way.  It is possible for reformers gradually 
to create a template for a modern, Western-style legal system while at the same time 
preserving the legal traditions that work so well for the majority of Niger’s contemporary 
citizens.  With this approach, if Niger develops natural or human resources that permit an 
entrée into the world of global trade, and if as a result of such economic development 
Niger’s citizens and their partners from the West require access to rational, predictable 
legal structures, they can seek out the state legal system and rely upon it.  Likewise, if 
increased literacy and general education lead to awareness among Niger’s people of 
human rights protections for women and other traditionally disenfranchised groups, then 
they too can turn toward state law as means of claiming their individual rights and 
privileges.  In short, legal reformers should establish the template of a modern legal 
system, but should have the patience to let that system compete with traditional law for 
the allegiance of Niger’s people.   
How could this gradual, dualistic, competitive approach to legal reform be 
effectuated?   Niger’s Washington Consensus reformers could begin by admitting that it 
is not possible to draft and debate major pieces of legislation meaningfully in a matter of 
weeks or even months, particularly where the legislation represents a radical departure 
from existing legal traditions.172 As important, reformers should propose that Niger’s 
National Assembly consider legislation to permit state courts to take cognizance of 
traditional evidence, such as gon evidence, in cases where the stakes are relatively low, as 
 
172 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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in misdemeanor theft cases, and where the accused and the victim agree to be bound by 
tradition.   
The effort to create continuity between old and new could also be aided by 
writing a guide to traditional evidence and the resolution of criminal matters.  Assuming 
a description of traditional procedures and practices could be agreed upon, the written 
collection could act as a sort of grande coutume to guide state judges in cases where 
application of traditional law was appropriate.173 
Niger’s legal reformers could go a long way toward legitimating their newly 
passed criminal laws by revisiting their very Western conception of punishment and 
honoring the country’s traditional emphasis on restorative justice.  As a concrete 
example, the law could delineate circumstances under which persons identified as 
wrongdoers are reinserted into their families and communities rather than punished by 
removal and imprisonment.174 
Whatever course Nigerien reformers and their sponsors pursue, they should not 
continue to do what they have done thus far.  They should not assume that they can 
impose an utterly foreign law on top of an engrained indigenous legal tradition and 
expect people to pay heed to the transplant.  They should understand that they cannot 
craft appropriate legislation without carefully studying the unwritten law that already 
exists.  Unless Nigerien legal reformers understand and account for indigenous legal 
practices such as the gon, and unless they look for ways to link the newly reformed laws 
to existing traditions, they will damage the traditions that act as the foundations of justice 
 
173 See Mission d’Analyse, supra note 12, at 46. 
174 See id. at 54; Interview with Oumarou Rabo Mainassara, supra note 15 (arguing for a nationally 
consistent “grande coutume”). 
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and peace in their society while rendering it unlikely that their reformed laws will ever be 
accepted as legitimate.  
 
